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ABSTRACT

This study analyzes the effect of minimum wage legislation during a period of
economic recession. In particular, I examine whether states with minimum wages higher
than the federal minimum wage fared better or worse during the recession that began
December 2007. Since minimum wages raise the price of labor above market price, firms
subject to this additional cost might experience greater adverse effects of the recession.
On the other hand, since state minimum wages are often enacted in states with relatively
high market wages, the disemployment effects of minimum wage legislation might be
negligible. Despite a large increase in minimum wages during this period, no significant
disemployment effects were estimated.
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CHAPTER 1
1.1 Introduction
Federal minimum wage legislation was first enacted under the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938 with the purpose of reducing extreme poverty. Since then, many
states have enacted legislation to raise the state minimum wage above the federal wage
floor. Such legislation is generally enacted when the federal real minimum wage
experiences a decline, and is most commonly seen in states with higher average wages.
Controversy surrounds minimum wage legislation (both state and federal), and in
particular, its effect on employment. The conventional model of labor supply and demand
predicts that an increase in the price of labor above the market-clearing price will reduce
demand for labor, save for in the extreme case of perfect inelasticity of demand (Stigler
1946, Borjas 1996). If those most likely to be subjected to the minimum wage are also
those most likely to experience extreme poverty, any resulting disemployment might be
counterproductive to the legislation. The full impact of minimum wage on poverty levels
will depend on the labor demand elasticity, with greater adverse effects occurring at
larger demand elasticities.
Alternatively, some economists have suggested that an increase in the minimum
wage will lead to a slight increase in employment rates (Stigler 1946, Card 1992a, Borjas
1996). This argument implies a monopsonistic labor market, or one in which low-wage
employers maintain some degree of market power. In such a market, minimum wage
legislation will increase employment by breaking the link between higher wages – which
are necessary to attract more workers with higher reservation wages – and an increasing
marginal cost of hiring. At the minimum wage, the marginal cost of each additional
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worker is constant and equal to the wage floor. Such an increase in labor will allow
growth in output levels, and ultimately a decrease in output price (Stigler 1946, Card
1992a, Katz and Krueger 1992).
Another theory suggests that an increase in the price of factors of production, such
as with minimum wage, will translate to higher output prices (Card 1992a, Katz and
Krueger 1992, Card and Krueger 1994). If we assume that firms are cost-minimizers,
every worker is essential to production. At a fast-food restaurant, for example, one
worker is needed to run the cash register, one is needed to man the fryer, etc., with no
additional capacity. In such a firm, any increase in the price of labor will likely be
observed as an increase in the price of output. In the long run, as the price of labor
exceeds the price of capital, we might expect to see a greater degree of automation, but
this change is not likely to occur instantaneously (Stigler 1946).
Theories also differ as to the likely effect on employment of state minimum
wages during periods of recession. One argument suggests that a higher relative wage
will lead to greater purchasing power – and thus greater consumer demand – in those
states with minimum wages above the federal minimum wage (Stigler 1946). During
economic recession, this increase in product demand will offset the disemployment
effects of the contraction. However, this argument relies on the uncertain assumption that
demand for unskilled workers is inelastic.
On the other hand, an increase in the price of labor above the market-clearing
price represents an additional cost burden to those firms that are subject to a state
minimum wage. During periods of recession, the labor market is unable to adjust to a
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lower wage. This might lead to greater disemployment effects in those states with wage
minima above the federal minimum wage.
Finally, since state minimum wages are often enacted in states with relatively
high market wages, the disemployment effects of minimum wage legislation, even during
a period of recession, might be negligible.
In my analysis, contrary to conventional theories of labor supply and demand,
there is no evidence of minimum wage effects despite a sizeable increase in the federal
minimum wage.
The plan of this thesis is as follows: the remainder of Chapter 1 examines the
relevant literature and establishes a theoretical framework. Chapter 2 describes the data
and introduces the regression model. Chapter 2 also examines graphical representation of
employment change and estimates minimum wage legislation on nonfarm employment
totals. Chapter 3 examines alternative specifications of minimum wage effects, including
the impact of minimum wages on industry-level employment, total weekly hours and
average weekly earnings. Chapter 4 summarizes the preceding chapters.

1.2 Literature Review
George Stigler (1946) was one of the first to hypothesize the effects of minimum
wage legislation, though he never tested his theories empirically. Referring to the federal
minimum wage, he contended that minimum wage legislation did not reduce poverty, but
simply reallocated wages and increased productivity. The reallocation occurs because
those slightly below the minimum wage experience a wage increase, while those far
below the minimum wage receive a wage reduction as a result of disemployment or a
shift to the informal sector. The productivity gains result from an increase in labor
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productivity from fear of termination as the opportunity cost of unemployment rises with
the higher wage, and from substituting capital for labor or instituting other efficiencies in
production.
Other studies have attempted to measure the effect of both federal and state-level
minimum wages on employment with varying results. David Neumark and William
Wascher (1992) used 1977-1989 Current Population Survey (CPS) panel data of 50 states
and the District of Columbia to measure the disemployment effect of teenagers against
coverage-adjusted relative minimum wages. Using fixed-effects OLS to control for state
and year differences, the authors examined the effect of minimum wage legislation within
states and across time – options not available with time series or cross-sectional analysis.
Because of the potential for endogeneity bias at the state level, however, Neumark and
Wascher also estimated disemployment effects using the average minimum wage level in
geographically bordering states to instrument for state minimum wage. Such endogeneity
could occur if legislators schedule enactment of minimum wage legislation so as to
minimize disemployment effects. Although the instrumental variable (IV) estimates were
greater in magnitude, the standard errors were large enough to render little statistical
difference from the OLS estimates.
Neumark and Wascher find a 1-2 percent reduction in teenage employment rates
for a ten percent increase in the minimum wage. We should consider this a lower bound,
as these elasticities are averages of the disemployment effect for all teenagers, including
those not subject to minimum wages. Estimates of the percent affected by minimum wage
range from 15 percent of teenagers nationally (Card 1992b) to 50 percent of teenagers in
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California (Card 1992a), therefore the disemployment elasticity of affected teens could be
as high as 2-13 percent for each ten percent increase in minimum wage.
As the youngest and least skilled workers, teenagers likely experience a greater
impact of minimum wage legislation. For instance, in a study of the national retail
industry, Joseph Sabia (2009) measured a similar reduction in the employmentpopulation ratio of workers aged 16-64 for a ten percent increase in the minimum wage
(1 percent). For teenagers, however, this elasticity jumped to –0.34, reflecting the greater
impact of minimum wage legislation on this demographic group. Since roughly 50
percent of those affected by minimum wage legislation are employed in retail trade
(Sabia 2009), estimates of the total effect are likely greater.
Other findings measured an even greater disemployment effect. Linda Bell (1997)
examined an increase in the federal minimum wage in both Colombia and Mexico using
firm-level panel data obtained from the Annual Industrial Survey of each country. In her
regression, Bell measured the effect of relative minimum wage on the employmentpopulation ratio, controlling for business cycle fluctuations as measured by real GNP and
input and output prices. Similar to Neumark and Wascher, Bell used fixed effects OLS to
control for differences in firm size and technology. She also formulated a two-stage least
squares estimation to correct for potential bias resulting from differences in aggregation:
the unit of observation is the firm, but the minimum wage effects are aggregated across
regions. In the first stage of this operation, Bell estimated employment changes against
indicators for minimum wage region by year, controlling for firm fixed-effects. In the
second stage, she regressed the region-year dummy variable against a year indicator and
the regional minimum wage to produce efficient, unbiased standard errors. Her analysis
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reveals a reduction in Colombian employment of 2-12 percent with a ten percent increase
in minimum wage.
The above values were obtained by dividing the range of the estimated elasticities
–0.15 and –0.33, by the percent affected. In this case, Bell assumes all those whose wages
fall within 1.5 times the minimum wage – or 27 percent of low-wage workers – were
affected by the legislation. Other studies (Katz and Krueger 1992, Card and Krueger
1994) suggest that the impact of minimum wage legislation is not this broad. In their
study of the effects of the April 1992 increase in the New Jersey state minimum wage on
fast-food employment, Card and Krueger (1992) found very little spillover effects on
wages above the new minimum. However, differences between the U.S. and Colombian
labor market might preclude such comparison. In either case, Bell’s estimated elasticities
are consistent with those obtained by Sabia (2009) and Neumark and Wascher (1992).
In a parallel analysis, Bell’s study suggests that the Mexican minimum wage is
not binding, and therefore the legislation has no effect on employment levels. However,
these estimations rely exclusively on data from large, stable manufacturing firms, which
constitute only 20 percent of total formal sector employment. Mexican household data
indicate that the true impact of minimum wage legislation might be greater than is
suggested by the firm-level data; presumably data availability limitations prevented Bell
from examining these broader effects.
Like Bell’s (1997) analysis of Mexican wage floors, other studies (Card 1992a,
Card 199b, Katz and Krueger 1992, Card and Krueger 1994) have found either no effect
of minimum wage legislation or a positive effect on employment rates. In one such study,
David Card (1992b) examines the April 1990 increase in the federal minimum wage
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using the variation in coverage across states to measure the effect on teenage employment
levels, as estimated from 1989 and 1990 CPS data. In his study, states were grouped and
compared by the degree of impact of minimum wage legislation, with the assumption that
those states with low average wages are more likely to experience a negative effect. Card
first analyzed the average change in teenage employment rates from 1989 to 1990 by
quarter, comparing the differences across impact groups. His results suggest that teenage
employment experienced a smaller decline in low-wage states than in medium- and highwage states (-1.2 percent, -2.7 percent, and –2.7 percent respectively). He credits the
relatively high impact of the 1990 recession on medium- and high-wage states for this
discrepancy, and tests this hypothesis with a fitted regression. When Card controls for
state-group and quarter effects, nearly all of the intergroup variation in teenage
employment disappears (-2.5 percent, -2.7 percent, and –2.6 percent respectively). These
results suggest that we should expect to see greater disemployment effects in high-wage
states during periods of recession that cannot be explained by differences in minimum
wage.
To test the robustness of his analysis, Card also estimated the disemployment
effects of minimum wages controlling for lagged changes in teenage and overall
employment rates, and against the wage change instrumented by the fraction of affected
workers in each state. Due to small sample size, Card aggregated state observations
across the last three quarters of 1989 and 1990 in these estimations. Despite a 13 percent
increase in the minimum wage, no statistically significant disemployment effect was
estimated. However, Card’s analysis does not consider possible lag effects of minimum
wage legislation. Such oversight might obscure the true effect of wage floors.
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In another study, Card (1992a) examined the effects of the 1988 increase in the
California state minimum wage on the employment-population ratios of teenagers using
CPS data. This study was designed as a natural experiment that compared the 1987-1989
employment effects in California to that of a control group of states that did not
experience minimum wage increases at that time. Using a difference-in-differences
approach, Card estimated a four percent increase in the Californian employmentpopulation ratio relative to the comparison group. This study also examined the effect of
the Californian legislation on retail employment and restaurant prices. Although Card
estimated a one percent relative decline in Californian employment in eating and drinking
establishments, he dismissed this as reflective of long-term trends without further
investigation. The sample choice and methodology of Card’s study is also criticized for
reasons discussed in further detail below.
Like Card’s study of the California retail industry, Lawrence Katz and Alan
Krueger (1992) measured a positive effect of minimum wage legislation on fast-food
restaurant employment in Texas. Fast-food restaurants employ relatively large numbers
of low-wage, low-skilled workers, and are therefore more likely to be constrained by
minimum wage legislation. Through phone surveys conducted roughly four months prior
to and four months following the April 1991 increase in the federal minimum wage, Katz
and Krueger used OLS and IV analysis to estimate the disemployment effect of the
relative wage gap, measured as the logged ratio of the restaurant’s starting wage prior to
the increase and the federal minimum wage rate that came into effect in April 1991.1 In
the IV specification, the wage gap was used as an instrument for the change in starting
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The wage gap is defined as 0 for those restaurants with pre-legislation starting wages above the April
1991 minimum wage.
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wage. Here, as in Card’s (1992b) analysis of the effect of the April 1990 increase in the
federal minimum wage, the hypothesis holds that those restaurants with the largest
impact – as measured by the wage gap – will experience the greatest employment effects.
Contrary to conventional labor market theory, this study estimated an increase in
employment of 2.4-2.6 full-time equivalent (FTE) employment. Moreover, the greatest
increase was measured in those restaurants with the largest wage gap.
In a similar study, Card and Krueger (1994) analyzed the effect of the 1992
increase in the New Jersey state minimum wage on fast-food restaurant employment. In
their study, the authors compared employment and product price outcomes to similar
restaurants in neighboring Pennsylvania – which did not experience an increase in
minimum wage at that time. Data for this analysis were obtained from phone surveys of
local fast-food chains conducted one month prior to the effective date of legislation and
roughly seven months following the minimum wage increase. Using difference-indifferences and first-differences estimations, Card and Krueger measured the change in
FTE employment against the change in minimum wage, as measured both by a New
Jersey dummy variable and by the proportional distance from the initial starting wage to
the new minimum wage.2 Similar to Katz and Krueger (1992), Card and Krueger
measured a 1.7 FTE employment increase relative to Pennsylvania. However, when
controlling for regional effects and when estimating the proportional change in
employment (as measured by the change in employment divided by the average
employment of both waves of their survey), the results are statistically insignificant from
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In their wage gap estimations, the proportional distance between the initial starting wage and new
minimum wage was set to 0 for those NJ restaurants with initial starting wages above the new minimum
wage and for all PA restaurants.
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zero. The authors credit measurement error for the attenuation of the wage gap coefficient
when including regional dummies. The effect of minimum wage on the proportional
change in employment recovers its statistical significance when employment change is
weighted by the initial employment level. As discussed below, these studies are also
faulted for their methodology.
Only a few studies (Card 1992, Katz and Krueger 1992, Card and Krueger 1994)
examined an alternative outcome to an increase in the minimum wage: an increase in
output price. In their study of the effects of increased minimum wage on New Jersey fastfood restaurants, Card and Krueger predict a roughly 2.2 percent increase in product cost
as a result of the 1992 minimum wage increase. They derived this figure by multiplying
the percent of affected workers (0.5 percent) by the percent increase in wage (15 percent)
and by labor’s share of total costs (30 percent). In fact, the authors did observe a four
percent relative increase in the price of a basket of goods at New Jersey fast-food
restaurants. However, the rate of increase was approximately the same in restaurants with
differing degrees of impact, which suggests an alternative reason for the price increase
other than an increase in the minimum wage. The authors credit this discrepancy to
product market competition, which prevents those restaurants most affected by the
minimum wage legislation from raising prices above competitors. If this were the case,
why would those restaurants least likely to be affected by the increase in minimum wage
raise their prices at all? Moreover, the authors’ explanation relies on the assumption that
eastern Pennsylvanian restaurants occupy a distinct product market, a questionable notion
when taking into account consumer and labor mobility. For instance, Camden, NJ is a
short 10 minute drive from Philadelphia, while the Pennsylvanian towns of Levittown,
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and Morrisville are less than 10 miles from Trenton, the capital of New Jersey. It is not
unrealistic to assume that commuters travel to the larger cities across the border for
shopping or work, or that they might purchase fast-food while in the neighboring state.
In their study of the Texas fast-food industry, Katz and Krueger (1992) applied a
two-stage least squares regression using the wage gap, or distance from the prelegislation starting wage to the new minimum wage as an instrument to measure price
effects of minimum wage legislation. Their estimates indicate a slight decrease in the
price of a full meal in restaurants with large mandated wage increases.3 Although the
estimates obtained are small and imprecise, when combined with the positive
employment effects estimated in their earlier analysis such an effect could indicate a
monopsonistic labor market.
Another possible effect of minimum wage legislation is a shift in average hours or
in the distribution of full- and part-time workers. As Sabia (2009) acknowledges, a priori
the direction of the effect is ambiguous. In response to the higher wage, firms could
reduce both hours and employment or they could increase hours for retained workers to
compensate for the reduction in employment. Using CPS panel data from 1979-2004,
Sabia estimated the impact on total hours of the effective minimum wage – the higher of
the state or federal minimum wage – controlling for state, month and year effects, and
labor market characteristics. He measured a one percent reduction in average weekly
hours worked in retail for a ten percent increase in minimum wage. However, when
conditioned upon retail employment, minimum wage legislation appears to have little
effect on average weekly hours.

3

In this study, a full meal consists of a soda, french fries and a main course.
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In their respective studies of the fast-food industry, Katz and Krueger (1992) and
Card and Krueger (1994) used survey data to measure the relative shift in distribution
between full- and part-time labor. Katz and Krueger suggest that imposition of a wage
floor could increase relative employment of full-time workers, who are typically older
and possibly higher-skilled. If starting wages are constant for both groups of workers,
firms would be inclined to employ those with higher productivity. In fact, Katz and
Krueger found no evidence of full-time worker substitution. On the other hand, Card and
Krueger (1994) measured an average 29 percent increase in full-time employment and a
corresponding 16 percent decrease in part-time employment following an increase in the
minimum wage. However, as Card and Krueger noted, these shifts in composition could
reflect seasonal differences between the two waves of their survey.
One study (Blanchflower and Oswald 1995) has suggested a feedback mechanism
between wages and unemployment, which might indicate endogeneity bias when
examining the effects of minimum wage legislation. In particular, Blanchflower and
Oswald estimate a negative relationship between regional unemployment levels and
wages, with reduced wage levels along a “wage curve” at higher levels of unemployment.
Using cross-sectional data from 12 countries and a sample of 3.5 million workers, the
authors estimate a global average wage elasticity of –0. 10 with an elasticity of –0.08 to –
0.11 for the U.S. These elasticities are robust against several specifications, including
estimations that use lagged unemployment as an instrument for contemporary
unemployment to correct for possible endogeneity bias, and a model that acknowledges
aggregation differences between the dependent and independent variables. The authors
attribute the negative relationship between wages and unemployment to efficiency wage
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theory, which implies that workers are willing to accept lower wages in periods of high
unemployment due to the increased opportunity cost of job loss. As an alternative
explanation, Blanchflower and Oswald credit union bargaining, whereby unions prioritize
jobs over wages when unemployment is high.
Despite the near universal scope of the wage curve, the methodology used in this
study and direction of causality between independent and dependent variables are
debatable. Indeed, David Card (1995) in a review of The Wage Curve (1994), questions
Blanchflower and Oswalds’s reliance on cross-sectional data to measure the relationship
between wages and unemployment, and hints at misspecification leading to composition
bias. Card suggests that cross-sectional data do not allow for changes in the
characteristics of workers across the business cycle. For example, during periods of
economic growth, construction employment and wages might increase, while government
employment might rise during recession – a change in average wage levels could simply
reflect a change in labor market composition.
Card also suspects spatial correlation between observations in the same region in
Blanchflower and Oswald’s estimates. In a model that corrects for this correlation by
controlling for mean regional worker characteristics, Card estimates a wage elasticity of –
0.05, roughly half the value obtained by Blanchflower and Oswald. Even with this
correction, however, Card’s model still ignores correlation between regions within the
same country. Blanchflower and Oswald use annual wage data in their U.S. regressions,
but high correlation between unemployment levels and annual hours suggest that the
annual wage elasticity is greater than the hourly wage elasticity. In fact, Card estimated
an elasticity of –0.20 when estimating the effect on annual earnings – double the value
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obtained by the authors of The Wage Curve. Perhaps their results are not as robust as they
would have us believe.
Although the authors are quick to discredit any resemblance between their curve
and the Phillip’s curve or a transposed supply function, the causality link between
average wages and unemployment seems specious at best. Perhaps their analysis simply
measures differing levels of labor demand across regions and countries – a tighter labor
market in one region relative to others will lead to both higher wages and greater
employment levels. Indeed, Neumark and Wascher (1992) suggest that exogenous shifts
in labor demand could produce a positive correlation between employment rates and
average wages.
While none of these studies have directly examined the effect of minimum wage
legislation during periods of recession, they offer key insight as to the necessary approach
of such analysis.

1.3 Components of a Strong Analysis
One of the first considerations of minimum wage analysis is whether to estimate
the change in state or federal minimum wages. Several studies have attempted to measure
the impact on employment levels of the federal minimum wage as opposed to the state
minimum wage (Card 1992b, Katz and Kruger 1992). However, several problems arise
when examining federal legislation. The most obvious difficulty is the absence of a
control group. One method is to compare years that experienced changes in legislation
with those that remain constant. Some studies (Neumark and Wascher 1992) have
suggested that inadequate variation exists in such time-series analysis, and that the few
changes that do occur are often correlated with changes in social welfare or training
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programs. Card (1992b) corrects for this by analyzing the variation in coverage across
states. Since minimum wage legislation will have a stronger impact on those states with
low average wages, we should expect to observe a greater disemployment effect in low
average-wage states. As noted above, Card’s estimates suggest that the April 1990
minimum wage had no significant effect on teenage employment.
Other studies have attempted to get around the issue of an inadequate control
group by examining changes occurring in individual states (Katz and Krueger 1992, Card
and Krueger 1994)). However, such analysis risk selectivity bias – the sample state might
not be representative of the national population. For instance, in the study of the
disemployment effects on fast-food workers, Card and Krueger (1994) compare the
employment rates of New Jersey to neighboring Pennsylvania. The difference in size,
demographics, and rate of urbanization, however, might suggest that these states are not
comparable. Indeed, the authors measured a four percent increase in prices for affected
and non-affected establishments in New Jersey, while Pennsylvania prices remained
unchanged. This difference could indicate a discrepancy in the product market that would
obviate comparison. Likewise, Card’s (1992a) study of the California teenage labor
market reveals differences with the comparison states in racial composition, rates of
unionization, percentage of college graduates, and mean wages. Such discrepancies could
bias the estimates, and conceal the true effect of minimum wage legislation. Meanwhile,
the most jarring feature of Katz and Krueger’s (1992) study of employment levels in
Texas fast-food restaurants is the complete absence of a control group. Moreover, their
treatment sample encompasses only those restaurants in metropolitan regions, while
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differences in size, demographics and average wage level suggest that Texas might not be
representative of all states.
A careful analysis will include data from the entire U.S. labor market, rather than
limit analysis to one or two states. Neumark and Wascher (1992) exploit the minimum
wage variation across states to estimate the effect on employment levels. By using panel
data, or a time-series cross-section, and weighting the minimum wage of each state by
coverage, the authors overcome the limitations associated with the federal minimum
wage model. Likewise, they avoid the pitfalls mentioned earlier of comparing a few
dissimilar states. Panel data allow for potential heterogeneity between sample states. As
long as the regression controls for state and year effects, the results will be more precise
than in time-series alone.
Another major limitation of past studies is the short time frame used in the
analysis. For instance, in his examination of the 1990 increase in the federal minimum
wage, Card (1992b) uses data from five calendar quarters before the increase to only
three quarters following the increase. If the labor market is slow to respond to changes in
input prices, the full impact of minimum wage legislation might not appear for several
years. Alternatively, if employers anticipate an increase in the minimum wage, they
might incorporate changes in production prior to the effective date of legislation. Such an
effect will be overlooked in Card and Krueger’s (1994) study, which measures labor
impacts only one month prior to the date the law is effected. This study errs on both sides
of the legislation: a follow up survey is conducted only seven months following the
increase. Moreover, Card’s (1992a) estimation of teenage employment in California
exhibits an initial increase in employment rates in the first two years following the
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legislation, but falls off in the third year. Without further data, it is impossible to know
whether this decline was an anomaly or a continuing trend.
Several studies (Neumark and Wascher 1992, Bell 1997, Sabia 2009) have
attempted to correct for this discrepancy by using lagged data to examine the long run
effects of minimum wage legislation. Neumark and Wascher (1992) measure a slight
increase in young adult disemployment following a one-year lag. For example, with zero
lags, Neurmark and Wascher estimate elasticities between –0.01 and –0.11; with a oneyear lag, these grow to a range of –0.12 to –0.17. Bell’s (1997) analysis of the lagged
effects of minimum wage on Colombian employment levels is more ambiguous: she
measured an employment elasticity of –0.29 following a one-year lag compared to an
elasticity range of –0.15 to –0.33 without the lag. In either case, the effect is negative and
significant. Sabia (2009) believes a thorough analysis should include cycles of both
macroeconomic growth and recession. Contrary to Neumark and Wascher (1992), Sabia
measured a smaller disemployment effect when using a lagged minimum wage variable,
in fact, the estimates are not significantly different from zero.
Several academics have stressed the effect of geography when estimating
minimum wage effects. Jeffrey Thompson (2009) argues that state-level averages conceal
larger impacts at the county level. With this in mind, Thompson used county-level data
from the 1996-2000 U.S. Census Bureau’s Quarterly Workforce Indicators to measure
the disemployment effects of the 1996 and 1997 increase in the federal minimum wage.
Using a difference-in-differences approach, Thompson followed earlier studies (Card
1992b, Katz and Krueger 1992) by grouping counties by their relative degree of impact.
He divided the county observations into thirds and fifths and used dummy variables to
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indicate high-impact groups in the quarter following the effective date of minimum wage
legislation. Thompson’s analysis identifies a 2.6-3.7 percent decrease in employment
following a ten percent increase in the minimum wage, with greater adverse effects in
smaller counties. For example, in high-impact counties in the thirds grouping, the
coefficient on the impact group-quarter indicator increased in magnitude from –0.031 to
–0.059 when including only small counties in the regression.
Charlene Kalenkoski and Donald Lacombe (2008) also examined the effect of
minimum wages at a county level using the 2000 Decennial Census Summary and state
minimum wage data obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Their analysis rests on
the assumption that county-level data are more accurate when analyzing teenagers, who
are limited in geographic mobility. Using OLS, Kalenkoski and Lacombe measured a
demand elasticity for teenage labor of –0.25 when controlling for logged per capita
income – as a proxy for consumer demand – and local labor market conditions. Despite
the inclusion of state fixed effects, the authors identify the possibility of unobserved,
spatially-correlated factors that affect both employment and minimum wage levels. With
this issue in mind, Kalenkoski and Lacombe estimate a spatial autoregressive (SAR)
model, which corrects for correlation across dependent variables, such as might arise with
agglomeration. In the SAR specification, the disemployment effect increased in
magnitude to –0.32. Again, these estimates are consistent with those obtained in other
studies (Neumark and Wascher 1992, Bell 1997, Sabia 2009, and Thompson 2009).
Many U.S. studies rely on Current Population Survey (CPS) household data of
worker hours and wages. Of those reviewed here, only Card and Krueger (1994), Katz
and Krueger (1992), Bell (1997), and Thompson (2009) obtained data directly from
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firms. Card and Krueger and Katz and Krueger relied on management surveys of fastfood restaurants, which are limited in scope and prone to survey error. Indeed,
McDonald’s restaurants were intentionally omitted from their analyses due to low
response rates. Thompson obtained his data from the Quarterly Workforce Indicators,
which is compiled from state unemployment insurance records, so his data is wider in
scope and likely more accurate than individual surveys of affected firms. Linda Bell, in
her analysis of minimum wage legislation in Colombia and Mexico, relied on firm data to
estimate disemployment effects. Although her estimates for Mexico were restricted to
large and stable manufacturing firms – which are less likely to experience a negative
impact of an increase in the minimum wage – her data allowed her to track employment
rates by firm during the period of analysis.
Similar estimations are possible using the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Current
Employment Survey (CES). As a counterpart to the CPS, the CES provides firm-level
estimates of employment. Unlike the CPS, monthly CES data are available as stateindustry observations, producing larger data sets and allowing measurements of state and
industry effects. State-level CPS data are only available as annual estimates.
To summarize: a thorough analysis of the impact of minimum wage legislation on
employment levels should include a long time-frame, preferably with periods of both
growth and recession; a national sample, perhaps at the county level; and firm data or a
longitudinal survey. The disemployment effect of minimum wage legislation, whether at
the state or federal level, has been estimated at an elasticity of –0.11 to –0.37, with
greater adverse effects for teenagers. There is little convincing evidence of monopsony in
markets for unskilled labor, nor is there indication that a mandated wage increase will
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trigger high prices. We should also expect to observe a greater impact of minimum wage
legislation in small counties and states with low average wages.
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CHAPTER 2
2.1 Data
This analysis includes monthly employment totals of the nine 1-digit industries of
the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) for each of the 50 states
plus the District of Columbia, from the start of the cyclical downturn in December 2007
to December 2009.4 (To simplify language, the District of Columbia will be referred to as
a state throughout the remainder of this thesis.) These totals were obtained from the
Bureau of Labor Statistic’s Current Employment Survey, which collects payroll data
representing about 400,000 worksites nationwide, corresponding to the payroll that
occurs on the 12th of the month. These firm-level data include total employment, average
weekly hours, and average weekly wages. Seasonally adjusted data is only available for
total employment. The nine industries are Mining and Logging; Construction;
Manufacturing; Trade, Transportation and Utilities; Information Services; Professional
and Business Services; Leisure and Hospitality; Government; and Other Services. The
data also include totals for Nonfarm employment.
Data on average hourly wage were obtained from the Occupational Employment
Statistics Survey, also available from the Department of Labor. These data provide the
mean hourly wage by state and year for all occupations as of May of the reported year. I
use this variable to control for employment effects that result from differences in the

4

The NAICS is commonly used by the Bureau of Labor Statistics and labor economists. The system is
pyramidal with nonfarm totals at the top and the nine industries noted on the second tier. These categories
are further subdivided at lower tiers. The industries chosen for my analysis represent the largest category of
NAICS industry below the nonfarm level.
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dynamism of state economies. For example, states with higher average wages are likely
to have greater economic growth rates or tighter labor markets.
State minimum wage data for each month in the study were collected online from
each state’s department of labor. In instances in which the information on the website
was ambiguous, the correct wage floors were confirmed via email. For those states that
support 2-tier wage systems, whereby firms with annual sales below a certain threshold
or those employing fewer than a minimum number of workers are subject to a lower state
minimum wage than larger firms, I followed the example of Neumark and Wascher
(1992) by using the higher minimum wage. For those states in which the state minimum
wage is below the federal minimum wage, the federal minimum was substituted. I then
used the Consumer Price Index, also obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, to
calculate the real minimum wage in December 2009 dollars.
In addition to the wage data, my analysis includes annual population by state.
These data, from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Population Division, correspond to the state
population as of July 1 of the reported year. This specification is included to control for
any differences in labor market size that might impact employment changes.
The time frame of analysis was chosen for several reasons. First, the Bureau of
Labor Statistics places the start of the recession in December 2007. Second, the federal
minimum wage has increased each July between 2007 and 2009 with the previous rise in
1997, providing consistent conditions across all years of interest. Third, although the time
frame commences less than one year prior to the recession, it can be assumed that the
recession was unforeseen – at least at the levels witnessed – and therefore few changes
were made in anticipation of the contraction. The end date was chosen as the most recent
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month during which data were available at the time the data were obtained. Since the
bulk of recessional disemployment effects were felt during 2008 and early 2009, this
short cutoff is appropriate.

2.2 Recent History of Federal Minimum Wage
By 2007, a full decade had passed since the last rise in the federal minimum
wage, which increased from $4.75 to $5.15 in 1997.5 Due to the delay, many states
unilaterally raised state minimum wages to levels greater than the federal minimum. In
fact, by January 2007, 30 states maintained minimum wages greater than the federal
minimum wage. That same year, the United States Congress passed an amendment that
would raise the federal minimum wage to $7.25 by July 24, 2009, with an initial wage
increase to $5.85 in July 2007 and a second increase to $6.55 in July 2008. Just prior to
the 2007 rise, the average state minimum wage was a full 20 percent greater than the
federal minimum. By December 2009, the number of states with minimum wages greater
than the federal minimum fell to 15, while the average state minimum was only two
percent greater than the federal level. Consequently, those states that were bound by the
federal minimum wage at the start of the recession experienced the greatest minimum
wage growth.

2.3 The Regression Model
When determining the effect of minimum wage legislation on employment levels,
we cannot fail to consider the impact that a larger population or more dynamic economy
might have on employment. If minimum wages are high as a result of a higher average
5

Department of Labor. http://www.dol.gov/whd/minwage/coverage.htm. Accessed 2/22/10.
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wage, analyses that ignore differences in average state wages will be biased. Similarly, if
states with larger populations fare differently during periods of economic downturn,
models that overlook differences in state population will also be biased.
Following Neumark and Wascher (1992), I have used a dummy variable to
separate the data into two groups: those states with a minimum wage higher than the
federal minimum in December 2007 at the beginning of the recession, and those states in
which the federal minimum is binding. The model is as follows:
ΔEi = α + α1MW + α2lnPopi + α3HrMeani,
where ΔEi is the percentage change in employment levels from December 2007 to
December 2009, MW is a dummy variable valued at one if the state minimum wage was
greater than the federal minimum in December 2007 or zero otherwise, lnPopi is the
logarithm of each state’s population in 2007, and HrMeani is the mean hourly wage by
state in 2007.
Since the number of states with minimum wages above the federal minimum
decreased from 32 states to 15 during this time period, in an alternative specification, I
used a dummy variable to estimate the change in employment for those states that
maintained minimum wages above the federal level in December 2009.6 As in the
previous model, the indicator is valued at one if the state minimum wage was greater than
the federal minimum in December 2009, or zero otherwise. The control variables remain
unchanged for this specification.

6

Refer to the Appendix for a complete of list of states in this group and in the larger December 2007 group,
as well as a list of each state’s change in employment from December 2007 to December 2009.
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2.4 Graphical Representation of Employment Change
Preliminary analysis of the effects of minimum wages during periods of recession
suggests that those states that support minimum wages higher than the federal minimum
fared worse during the recent economic downturn. Figures 2.1 and 2.2 provide graphical
representation of the average monthly percentage change in employment for both groups
of states between January 2006 and December 2009 by industry. These figures reveal
several interesting patterns. First, on average, it appears that states with minimum wages
above the federal minimum in December 2007 experienced more dynamic shifts in
employment. Second, all states and industries suffered a noticeable decline in
employment levels usually starting around December 2007, save for government, which
experienced an increase in employment for both groups. Construction employment fell as
early as June 2006 for those states with minimum wages higher than the federal minimum
at the start of the recession; the same month also marked the beginning of the decline in
manufacturing employment for both groups of states. Prior to the decline, employment
totals for all states and industries remained steady or were slightly rising. Finally, in most
instances, the monthly percentage change in employment fell at a greater rate in those
states with minimum wages higher than the federal minimum wage compared to those in
which the federal minimum was binding. Mining and Logging appear to have undergone
the opposite effect, with greater negative change in those states at the federal level, but
please note, the percentage decrease was quite small for both groups of states. Even
government, which saw an average increase in employment for both groups of states,
experienced earlier declines in those states with a higher minimum wage, while those
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bound by the federal minimum continued to demonstrate positive change though late
2009.

2.5 Preliminary Statistical Analysis
Table 2.1 provides summary statistics for each variable of interest and for each
group of states – those with minimum wages above the federal level in December 2007 or
December 2009 and those bound by federal minimum wage legislation. Average
employment loss during this period was around 5.6 percent (standard deviation 2.7),
however, states with minimum wages greater than the federal minimum experienced a
decline a full percentage point greater than those states bound by the federal minimum
(6.0 percent and 5.0 percent respectively). Such outcomes seem to support the theory that
higher minimum wages created a greater cost burden during the recent downturn., and
therefore caused greater relative decreases in employment. In fact, when we examine the
decline in employment of the smaller group of 15 states that maintained minimum wages
above the federal level in December 2009, the loss of employment is even greater (6.6
percent), suggesting that higher wages do lead to greater disemployment. A quick
examination of the percentage change in real minimum wage, however, will soon
discredit this assumption.
The average change in state real minimum wage from December 2007 to
December 2009 was 11.5 percent, with the greatest increase experienced by New Mexico
(24.7 percent) – which saw the state minimum wage grow from $5.85 to $7.50 in only
two years. The average change for those states with minimum wages above the federal
level was only 6.0 percent, while the growth rate of those states bound by the federal
legislation was more than triple that of the first group at 20.8 percent. If conventional

26

economic theory holds, we should expect to see greater disemployment in those states
that experienced the greatest increase in real minimum wage, (those at the federal
minimum wage level at the beginning of the period). This is in direct contrast to the
results outlined above. This discrepancy becomes clearer when comparing the large
decline in employment for those 15 states with minimum wages above the federal level in
December 2009 to the relatively small percentage change in real minimum wage levels
for these states (6.1 percent).
Even if we examine the change in minimum wage relative to average wage, this
contradiction remains. Table 2.2 reports the change in relative minimum wages before
and after each shift in the federal minimum wage. The earlier month for each year
corresponds to the month just prior to the increase in the federal minimum wage, while
the later month reflects the dates of analysis, as well as the month preceding a popular
month for state minimum wage increase: January.
For those states with minimum wages above the federal level, minimum wage
relative to average hourly wage remained fairly constant from June 2007 to December
2009. This fact is further substantiated by the small percentage change in relative
minimum wage experienced by both groups of states that maintained minimum wages
above the federal minimum in either December 2007 or December 2009, as reported in
Table 2.1 (2.2 percent for both groups of states).7 In sharp contrast, those states bound by
the federal minimum wage experienced a noticeable increase in relative minimum wage –
growing from 30 percent to 38 percent of average wages, or a growth rate of 16.0 percent

7

The average increases in relative minimum wage reported in Table 2.1 do not directly correspond to the
same values in Table 2.2, because the former calculation applies only to those states with minimum wages
above the federal level in December 2007 or December 2009. The calculations in Table 2.2 refer to those
states with minimum wages above the federal level as of the date reported in the table.
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for those states that were at the federal level in December 2007 as shown in Table 2.1.
Again, these results might suggest that those states bound by the federal minimum wage
would face greater disemployment effects during periods of recession, as this group of
states experienced comparatively larger increases in relative minimum wages.

2.6 Regression Results
Table 2.3 provides the results of the regression analysis. In column 1, I include
only the minimum wage dummy variable for states with minimum wages above the
federal floor at the beginning of the recession. In this model, the effect of minimum
wages on employment totals was negative and slightly less than 1 percent. However, in
this specification, minimum wage effects were statistically indistinguishable from zero.
When the population variable is added to the regression in column 2, the
coefficient on the minimum wage variable rises, meaning greater disemployment effects
occur when differences in population size are omitted. The population coefficient is both
negative and statistically significant, suggesting that states with larger populations
suffered greater disemployment during the recession. Again, the minimum wage variable
remains statistically insignificant.
In column 3, I include state mean hourly wage as a control for labor market
differences, and in column 4, I substitute the December 2009 indicator variable for the
December 2007 dummy but include the mean hourly wage and population effects. In
these specifications, the minimum wage variable becomes more negative when state
average wages are included in the analysis – minimum wage effects are washed out if not
set against the backdrop of average wage, as seen when comparing columns 2 and 3.
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Moreover, the minimum wage variable is negative and significant in specifications
controlling for both population and mean hourly wage.
The estimations shown in columns 3 and 4 suggest that those states that are bound
by the higher state minimum rather than the federal minimum experienced greater
disemployment during the recent recession. For example, column 3 shows that
employment declined 1.5 percentage points more in states with minimum wages higher
than the federal level in December 2007 compared to other states. States with minimum
wages higher than the federal minimum wage in December 2009 lost 2.3 percentage
points more employment than states at the federal minimum, as shown in column 4.
When we consider that average employment change during this period was a decrease of
5.6 percent, this result suggests that more than one-fourth of the disemployment during
this period is related to minimum wage legislation! However, before coming to any firm
conclusions regarding this analysis, I need to check the model for misspecification.
When comparing columns 1 and 2 to column 3, it appears evident that the control
variables are justified and well-chosen. The coefficients on both the population and mean
hourly wage variables are significant and large, which implies that differences in average
wage and labor market size do affect employment levels during periods of economic
recession. These effects will be discussed later.
I also tested the model for the “best” set of regressors using the Akaike
information criterion (AIC). This test for misspecification comprises a trade-off between
minimizing the sum of squared errors and limiting the number of regressors (Griffiths,
Hill and Judge 1993). Although additional explanatory variables might reduce
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unobserved error, the inclusion of extraneous independent variables will decrease
variation in the observations.
The best model is one that minimizes the AIC value as given by the following
equation:
ln(SSEi /N) + 2Ki /N,
where SSEi is the sum of squared errors for model i, N is the number of observations, and
Ki is the number of coefficients in model i. This test can be performed with Stata or other
statistical software. In all instances, the specifications that include controls for both
population and mean hourly wage reported the smallest AIC values.
Following other studies (Card 1992b, Katz and Krueger 1992, and Thompson
2009), I wanted to measure the effect of minimum wage by relative degree of impact. A
model that includes a variable representing minimum wage relative to average wage will
more accurately reflect the effect of the wage floor on employment levels. In states with
minimum wages close to the average wage, or those with a high relative minimum wage,
more employees are likely impacted by increases in minimum wage than states with low
minimum wage to average wage ratios. Furthermore, since both average and minimum
wages increased during this period, (and sometimes quite dramatically – the federal
minimum wage grew by 24 percent from December 2007 to December 2009), a more
precise analysis would measure the percentage change in employment levels against the
changed interaction of minimum and average wages.
With this issue in mind, I created a relative minimum wage variable that measures
the change in the ratio of minimum wage to average wage from December 2007 to
December 2009. This value was then multiplied by 100 to create a variable for the
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percentage change in relative minimum wages. This relative minimum wage variable was
substituted for the minimum wage dummy in the previous models.
When examining the effect of relative minimum wages on total nonfarm
employment (in column 5), the coefficient is positive, though small compared to the
overall change in employment and statistically insignificant. The analysis suggests that
changes in relative minimum wage had little impact on employment levels during the
period of analysis. The coefficients on the population and mean hourly wage variables for
this model are similar in sign to the dummy variable specifications, which suggests that
the specification is robust against different measures of minimum wage.
This analysis contradicts traditional theories of minimum wage legislation, which
assert that large minimum wage increases will lead to greater disemployment. The
variable of interest is the relative change in minimum wage across states – a change that
was much more dramatic for those states without a unique minimum wage.
To better illustrate this idea, between December 2007 and December 2009, those
states with minimum wage levels (as of December 2009) equal to the federal wage floor
experienced a 13.8 percent (standard deviation 8.2) average increase in real minimum
wage. This is a significant difference when compared to those states in which the federal
minimum was not binding in December 2009, which underwent only a 6.1 percent
(standard deviation 7.0) average increase in real minimum wage. (This average falls to
4.7 percent with a standard deviation of 4.9 without New Mexico’s minimum wage,
which increased by an anomalous 24.7 percent during this period.) Thus according to
conventional market theory, the states at the federal level should have suffered greater
disemployment effects.
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The model in column 6 substitutes a variable representing the percentage change
in real minimum wage for the relative minimum wage. In this instance, the effect of the
change in real minimum wage is indistinguishable from the effect of the relative
minimum wage change. The sign and magnitude of the coefficients on these variables, as
well as the standard error are exactly the same, while the coefficients on the control
variables are nearly identical in both size and variance. This suggests that the change in
real minimum wage alone – not the change in its relationship to state mean wage –
describes the employment effects observed in column 5. This conclusion is further
supported by the relative change in real average wages during this period. As shown in
Table 2.1, the average change in the real mean hourly wage from 2007 to 2009 was
similar for both groups, 3.7 percent (standard deviation 1.5) for those states above the
federal minimum wage, and 4.0 percent (standard deviation 1.4) for those states in which
the federal minimum was binding. Again, the change in real minimum wages appears to
have had no effect on employment levels.
When comparing the minimum wage dummy models to those using the change in
real minimum wage, the results seem to diverge. On the one hand, the minimum wage
dummy specifications suggest that states with minimum wages above the federal level
undergo greater disemployment during periods of recession – a view consistent with
traditional theories of labor economics. On the other hand, the change in minimum wage
and relative minimum wage models imply that those states that experienced larger
relative growth in minimum wage experienced little change in employment. Is there some
inherent difference between those states with minimum wages above the federal
minimum that could be driving the negative values obtained in the dummy
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specifications? Or alternatively, is there some unique feature of states that are bound by
the federal minimum wage level that would facilitate employment growth during periods
of recession?
As a final note, the effects of hourly mean wages and population sizes in all
specifications were significant though small in magnitude. According to these
estimations, a $1 increase in a state’s mean hourly wage at the beginning of the period of
analysis resulted in an increase in employment of approximately 0.3 percentage points.
This appears to demonstrate a positive relationship between average wages and
employment. However, this does not support Blanchflower and Oswald’s (1995) wage
curve theory for two reasons. First, the independent variable in this specification is static
– it measures the average wage level at the start of the recession – while the dependent
variable measures the average change in employment. According to Blanchflower and
Oswald, the wage curve does not demonstrate a dynamic response, but rather a static
equilibrium. Second, the direction of causality in Blanchflower and Oswald’s estimates
suggests that high unemployment results in low wages. My analysis credits high average
wages for relatively greater employment.
Contrary to mean hourly wage, the effect of relative population size on
employment indicates a 1.4 percentage point employment loss for each log-point increase
in state population. A likely reason for this population effect is discussed in Section 2.9.

2.7 The Decline of the Construction Industry
Figure 2.2 reveals two potential sources of the paradoxical effects noted above:
construction and government employment. I discuss each source in turn.
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For both groups of states, the construction industry appears to have been hit
harder by the recession than other industries, however, the impact was felt much sooner
and to a greater degree by those states with minimum wages above the federal minimum
at the start of the recession. In fact, average construction employment began to decline as
early as June 2006 in those states with minimum wages greater than the federal level. The
construction industries in these states saw an average employment decrease of 24.8
percent (standard deviation 9.3), from an average of 172,000 construction jobs in
December 2007 to 132,000 jobs in December 2009, or roughly 40,000 construction jobs
lost. In contrast, those states bound by federal minimum wage legislation continued to
experience construction employment growth through November 2007. This group of
states suffered a slightly smaller percentage loss in construction employment (20.2
percent with a standard deviation of 9.6), and a smaller magnitude of decline – from a
peak of 136,000 construction jobs in December 2007 to an average of 111,000 in
December 2009, or an average decline in employment of 25,000 jobs. Such figures might
imply that the construction industry alone can account for the significant decline in
employment for those states with minimum wages above the federal level.
To test this possibility, I created a variable representing the ratio of construction
employment to total nonfarm employment in December 2007 for each state with
available data.8 If declines in construction employment are driving the negative effect

8

Construction employment data were not reported for DC, DE, HI, MD, NE, SD, and TN.
To test whether the changes seen in Table 2.5 are a result of this omission, I reran the regressions in
columns 3-6 of Table 2.3 excluding those states for which construction employment were not reported. In
these estimates, the minimum wage status at the beginning of the period of analysis had no significant
impact on employment totals, however, the disemployment effect in those states above the federal level in
December 2009 was greater with the exclusion (-2.7 percentage points). The coefficients on the real and
relative minimum wage variables fell by 0.02 percentage points to 0.05 with the omission, but remain
statistically insignificant. These results do not reflect the changes seen in Table 2.5.
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seen in columns 3 and 4 of Table 2.3, the coefficients on the minimum wage indicators
should be insignificantly different from zero in regressions that account for differences in
relative size of state construction industries. Unfortunately, as shown in Table 2.5, the
results of this analysis seem only to confound the effect of minimum wage legislation on
employment changes.
I first examined the effect of construction employment on the simple dummy
variable regressions, which include indicator variables for states that supported minimum
wages above the federal minimum in either December 2007 or December 2009.
Surprisingly, as shown in columns 1 and 2, these estimates suggest that the
disemployment effects of minimum wage legislation increase when controlling for
differences in construction industry employment. In both regressions, the coefficient on
the minimum wage indicator variable is larger in magnitude and precision than the
regression without the construction variable. For those states with wages higher than the
federal level in December 2007, disemployment effects are 1.7 percentage points greater
than those states at the federal level, as compared to a decrease in employment of 1.5
percentage points when excluding the effects of the construction industry. For the group
of states with higher wages in December 2009, disemployment effects also rose (became
more negative), from -2.3 percentage points in the earlier regression to -2.5 percentage
points when controlling for construction industry decline. Such estimates seem to
strengthen the hypothesis that minimum wage legislation leads to greater disemployment.
Next, I examined the effects of the change in real minimum wage and relative
minimum wage on employment, controlling for differences in relative size of state
construction industries. The results of these specifications, as shown in columns 3 and 4,
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seem to suggest that the construction industry had some bearing on the overall
employment patterns noted in Table 2.3. As in the earlier regression, the coefficients on
those variables representing change in real minimum wage and change in minimum wage
relative to state mean wage were small and positive. In fact, when controlling for
construction industry decline, the effect of the change in real minimum wage becomes
statistically significant at the 90 percent confidence level. This suggests that states that
experienced greater minimum wage growth, or those at the federal level in December
2007, experienced employment growth of one percentage point for each ten percent
increase in real minimum wage when correcting for construction-industry decline. These
results coincide with the summary statistics in Table 2.4, which suggest that states bound
by federal legislation in December 2007 had higher percentages of employment in
construction than other states.
The greater degree of construction employment in those states at the federal level
also explains the increased disemployment effect observed in columns 1 and 2 as
compared to similar specifications in Table 2.3. When controlling for the impact of the
declining construction industry – which produced a greater disemployment effect in those
states at the federal level – the decrease in employment is enhanced in states above the
federal wage floor relative to those bound by the federal minimum wage.
Here are a few final thoughts on the regressions that include differences in
construction industry employment. In all specifications the negative effect of relative
population size is enhanced compared to those estimates that omit construction industry
effects. However, the state mean hourly wage seems to have diminished in importance in
models including construction industry employment. Finally, the negative and extremely
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precise coefficient on the construction employment variable indicates that a ten percent
increase in construction employment relative to total nonfarm employment during the
period of analysis led to an 8.7 percentage point decrease in total employment.

2.8 Job Growth in Government Services
One glaring outlier in the graphical analysis is government employment – the only
industry to witness an average growth in employment from December 2007 to December
2009. The average employment change in government services during this period was an
increase of 1.3 percent (standard deviation 2.2). For those states with minimum wages
above the federal minimum in December 2007, this growth averaged only 0.7 percent
(standard deviation 2.4). This is in stark contrast to those states bound by the federal
minimum during the same period, which experienced average growth in government
employment of 2.4 percent (standard deviation 1.5). States that maintained minimum
wages above the federal level in December 2009, or those that exhibited the largest
employment decreases, witnessed an average decrease in government employment of 0.1
percent (standard deviation 2.6) during the period of analysis These summary statistics
suggest that states at the federal minimum wage level might be cushioned from the
impact of the recession and simultaneous increase in minimum wage by maintaining a
larger percentage of total employment in government services. In fact, regressions
including a variable representing relative differences in percentage of government
employment seem to support this conclusion.
For this analysis, I estimated the simultaneous effects of government services and
construction employment, minimum wage, and change in minimum wage on employment
levels. In these specifications, I included a variable similar to that for construction
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employment to control for the percentage of total nonfarm employment in government
services. Interestingly, as shown in Table 2.6, the inclusion of the government
employment variable washes out the effect of the December 2007 minimum wage
indicator seen in column 1 of Table 2.5. This suggests that higher minimum wages have
no significant effect on employment levels during periods of recession if the relative size
of the construction industry and government employment are included in the analysis.
Since states at the federal level maintained greater degrees of government
employment at the beginning of the recession and experienced greater growth in
government services, the negative effects seen in columns 1 and 2 of Table 2.5 could
reflect a relatively smaller increase in government employment during the period of
analysis combined with roughly equal disemployment in other non-construction
industries.
The results of the specifications including the change in real minimum wage and
relative minimum wage also confirm this outcome. In each of these analyses, the positive
employment effects that were observed in the earlier regression disappear, leaving only
the government and construction variables statistically significant. This also suggests that
relative increases in government services, and not monopsony, account for the positive
effect of the change in real minimum wage seen in column 4 of Table 2.5. In estimations
omitting the construction-employment effects (results not shown), the relative size of
government employment is the only statistically significant effect of minimum wage
legislation in three of the four specifications – even population size is insignificant in
these specifications. This outcome implies that differences in population size are most
strongly felt in differences in relative government size. Likewise, these results suggest
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that the effect of average wages on employment levels is primarily influenced by
government employment. In fact, in estimates not shown, mean hourly wage was found
to be positively correlated with relative government size.
Surprisingly, the effect of the minimum wage dummy variable for those states
that maintained minimum wages above the federal level in December 2009, as shown in
Table 2.6, still remains negative and significant despite the inclusion of the relative size
of government employment. Moreover, in spite of the dramatic increase in the federal
minimum wage during this period, the minimum wage status of a state in December 2009
appears to have a stronger bearing on employment levels than any other wage factor. In
fact, in all analyses this specification exhibits greater explanatory power as represented
by the adjusted R2 value than any other estimation of the same group – a gap of ten
percentage points in some instances.
Finally, this analysis suggests that a ten percentage point increase in the
percentage of total employment in government services contributed to an average
employment increase of approximately 4.9 percentage points during the recession that
began in December 2007. I hesitate to generalize this outcome, however, because the
government response might differ in degree of urgency following other economic
downturns.
One explanation for the evident lack of disemployment in those states that
experienced the largest increase in minimum wage suggests that the federal minimum
wage was not binding during the period of analysis – the market wage was already above
the minimum wage level. In fact, the large number of states with minima above the
federal level in December 2007 – more than 60 percent of total states – provides support
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for this possibility. Moreover, as shown in Table 2.1, summary statistics suggest that a
gap in real minimum wage in December 2007 between those states above the federal
level and those bound by the federal legislation disappeared following the federal
minimum wage increase of 2009. Indeed, the real minimum wage differential shrunk
from an average of $1.09 in December 2007 to only $0.25 in December 2009. If $7.25 is
closer to the true market wage, then the effect of an increase in minimum wage to this
level would have little impact on average employment levels.

2.9 Robustness Checks for Dummy Variable Estimations
The above analyses indicate some factor unique to the group of 15 states with
minimum wages higher than the federal minimum in December 2009 that is driving the
estimated disemployment effects. Based on the results of these specifications, those states
that had minimum wages above the federal requirement in December 2009 experienced a
1.8-2.5 percentage point average decrease in employment compared to those states bound
by the federal minimum. Unfortunately, there do not seem to be any obvious
characteristics linking these states other than the higher minimum wage. The states of this
group are not situated in a specific geographic region, nor do they support a distinct
industry.
Perhaps not coincidentally, three of the states in this group, Nevada, California
and Michigan also appear in the top five states with the highest decreases in employment
during the period of analysis (see Tables A.1 and A.2 of the Appendix). If these three are
driving the disemployment effect seen in column 4 of Table 2.3, estimates that omit these
states should produce a statistically insignificant coefficient on the variable indicating
minimum wage status at the end of the period of analysis. However, even in
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specifications excluding states that are particularly vulnerable to recession (results not
shown), the minimum wage effect of those states with minimum wages above the federal
level in December 2009 is still large, negative and statistically significant from zero at the
90 percent confidence level (-1.52 percentage points).
If the absolute minimum wage rather than relative minimum wage is driving the
results shown in Tables 2.3, 2.5 and 2.6, then we should expect to observe
disemployment effects when the dummy variable is replaced by the nominal minimum
wage in the employment change estimations. In fact, as shown in Table 2.7, the effects of
nominal minimum wages on employment levels is statistically insignificant from zero
when controlling for relative differences in construction and government employment.
According to these specifications, those states with minimum wages above the federal
level in December 2009 experienced similar employment change to other states during
the period of analysis. This suggests that another labor market variable common to these
15 states caused greater relative unemployment and also influenced minimum wage
policy.
Omitted variable bias might explain the relative disemployment effect seen in this
group. With this possibility in mind, I reran the regressions in column 4 of Table 2.3 and
column 2 of Table 2.6 with additional labor market control variables, as shown in Table
2.8. Following Kalenkoski and Lacombe (2008), I estimated the effect of minimum wage
on employment change, controlling for state median income as a proxy for consumer
demand. If relative declines in employment in these states are reflective of changes in
product demand, we should expect to see attenuation in the coefficient for the December
2009 dummy variable. As with the earlier regressions, those states with minimum wages
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above the federal level in December 2009 continue to exhibit relative employment
decreases even when controlling for differences in consumer demand and relative sizes of
construction and government employment (-1.6 percentage points). Surprisingly, the
effect of differences in median income had no effect on changes in employment.
Finally, as many studies have done before (Katz and Krueger 1992, David Card
1992a, David Card 1992b, Neumark and Wascher 1992, Kalenkoski and Lacombe, Sabia
2009, Thompson 2009), I included in the analysis the unemployment rate as reported at
the beginning of the recession. Again, the coefficient of the December 2009 dummy
variable remained statistically significant in all specifications except when controlling for
both construction and government employment. This suggests that this group of states
experienced higher rates of disemployment on average relative to other states, regardless
of minimum wage levels. However, with five explanatory variables and only 44
observations, it is possible that the additional variable has eroded the variation in the data.
To assess this possibility, I performed an AIC test on the estimation in column 2 of Table
2.6 both with and without the unemployment rate. If variation has been compromised
from the inclusion of an extraneous variable, the AIC on the specification incorporating
unemployment should be greater than the model without the unemployment rate. In fact,
the AIC is minimized in the specification that controls for differences in unemployment,
which justifies the inclusion of the variable.
Differences in average levels of unemployment might explain the population
effect noted above. In estimates not shown, population is positively correlated with
unemployment rates, which suggests that larger populations maintain relatively higher
unemployment rates, and therefore experience greater negative employment growth.
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Incidentally, there is little evidence of the downward-sloping wage curve
described by Blanchflower and Oswald (1995). Indeed, in a measurement of the state
mean hourly wage against the state unemployment rate controlling for population
differences (results not shown), the coefficient is positive and statistically significant. The
regression measured a $0.78 increase in the average hourly wage for a one percentage
point increase in the unemployment rate. However, differences in aggregation between
dependent and independent variables might also explain this discrepancy – the population
and average wage data are reported annually, while the unemployment rate is reported
monthly. To correct for this, I calculated the average annual 2007 unemployment rate
using the monthly rates available through the Bureau of Labor statistics. Even using the
annual data, however, I am unable to confirm the results of the wage curve estimations.
In this specification, the effect of the unemployment rate on average wages is still
positive, though statistically insignificant.
In summary, there appear to be no disemployment effects of minimum wage
legislation despite a large increase in the federal minimum wage during the period of
analysis. Although, simple regressions that use dummy variables to separate states by
minimum wage status suggest that minimum wage legislation caused greater
disemployment in states not bound by the federal wage floor, when controlling for other
state-level economic conditions, such as the relative size of the construction industry, the
degree of government employment, and the unemployment rate, these negative effects
disappear. These results coincide with estimations of the impact of real and relative
minimum wage changes on employment, which indicate no statistical evidence of
minimum wage effects. Likewise, differences in state median income levels appear to
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have no effect on employment levels, and the data offer little support for the wage curve
theory.
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Figures and Tables
Figure 2.1
Employment Change by Industry
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*The solid red line corresponds to those states with minimum wages greater than the federal minimum
wage in December 2007. The dashed blue line represents those states bound by the federal minimum wage.
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Figure 2.2
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*The solid red line corresponds to those states with minimum wages greater than the federal minimum
wage in December 2007. The dashed blue line represents those states bound by the federal minimum wage.
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wage in December 2007. The dashed blue line represents those states bound by the federal minimum wage.
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wage in December 2007. The dashed blue line represents those states bound by the federal minimum wage.
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Table 2.1
State Labor Market Outcomes by Minimum Wage Status
(Standard Deviation in Parentheses)

Variable
% Change in Employment,
Dec 2007 - Dec 2009
% Change in Relative Minimum
Wage, Dec 2007 - Dec 2009
% Change in Real Minimum Wage,
Dec 2007 - Dec 2009
% Change in Real State Mean Hourly
Wage, Dec 2007 - Dec 2009
% Change in Minimum Wage
Relative to Industry Mean Wage,
Dec 2007 - Dec 2009a
Real Minimum Wage Dec 2007

Real Minimum Wage Dec 2009

State Mean Hourly Wage 2007

Ln State Population 2007

Number of states

State
Totals

State Min
Wage > Federal
Min Wage in
Dec 2007

State Min
Wage = Federal
Min Wage in
Dec 2007

State Min
Wage > Federal
Min Wage in
Dec 2009

-5.6

-6.0

-5.0

-6.6

(2.7)

(2.8)

(2.5)

(3.0)

7.4

2.2

16.0

2.2

(8.0)

(5.4)

(1.5)

(5.7)

11.5

6.0

20.8

6.1

(8.6)

(5.8)

(1.0)

(7.0)

3.9

3.7

4.1

3.7

(1.4)

(1.5)

(1.3)

(2.0)

10.2

4.8

19.8

5.4

(11.6)

(8.4)

(10.1)

(9.1)

6.70

7.10

6.01

7.39

(0.68)

(0.55)

0

(0.58)

7.42

7.51

7.26

7.81

(0.34)

(0.40)

(0.06)

(0.42)

18.85

19.89

17.10

20.79

(2.82)

(2.99)

(1.20)

(3.39)

15.1

15.2

15.0

15.1

(1.0)

(1.1)

(0.1)

(1.2)

51

32

19

15

Source: Employment totals and mean hourly wages data were obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics;
population data were obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau; and minimum wage data were obtained from
each state’s department of labor.
a There are insufficient data for Mining and Logging and Information Services industry wages, so these
industries were excluded from this regression. Mining and Logging wage data were only reported for WV
and WY during the period of analysis. Information Services wage data were only reported for CA, IL, MA,
MI, NC, NY, PA, TN, UT, and WA.
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Table 2.2
State and Federal Minimum Wage Outcomes
(Standard Deviation in Parentheses)
Relative Minimum Wage
Average %
States With
Difference
Minimum Wage
Between
State Minimum State Minimum
Above Federal Federal
State & Federal Wage> Federal Wage= Federal
Minimum Wage Minimum Wage Minimum Wage Minimum Wage Minimum Wage

Jun 2007

32

5.15

Dec 2007

32

5.85

Jun 2008

33

5.85

Dec 2008

26

6.55

Jun 2009

28

6.55

Dec 2009

15

7.25

19.9
(17.9)
11.3
(11.4)
12.8
(12.4)
6.09
(7.38)
7.50
(8.43)
2.82
(4.69)

0.35
(0.04)
0.35
(0.04)
0.35
(0.04)
0.35
(0.04)
0.36
(0.05)
0.36
(0.05)

0.30
(0.02)
0.34
(0.02)
0.33
(0.02)
0.36
(0.03)
0.35
(0.03)
0.38
(0.04)

Source: Employment totals and mean hourly wage data were obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics;
and minimum wage data were obtained from each state’s department of labor.
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Table 2.3
Effects of Minimum Wages and Relative Minimum Wage on Employment
(Standard Error in Parentheses)
Nonfarm Totals
1

2

3

4

5

6

-0.92
(0.79)

-0.70
(0.72)

-1.54*
(0.79)

-

-

-

Minimum Wage Dummy
2009

-

-

-

-2.33***
(0.78)

-

-

% Change in Relative
Minimum Wage
Dec 2007- Dec 2009

-

-

-

-

0.07
(0.05)

-

% Change in Real
Minimum Wage
Dec 2007- Dec 2009

-

-

-

-

-

0.07
(0.05)

Ln Population 2007

-

-1.09***
(0.34)

-1.14***
(0.32)

-1.20***
(0.31)

-1.14***
(0.33)

-1.12***
(0.33)

Hourly Mean Wage 2007

-

-

0.30**
(0.14)

0.35***
(0.13)

0.29*
(0.14)

0.28*
(0.14)

-5.04***
(0.62)

11.3**
(5.07)

6.87
(5.27)

6.59
(4.99)

5.64
(5.70)

5.27
(5.76)

0.01

0.17

0.23

0.30

0.20

0.21

Minimum Wage Dummy
2007

Constant

Adjusted R

2

Dependent variable is the percentage change in total nonfarm employment from December 2007
to December 2009.
Source: Employment totals amd mean hourly wages data were obtained from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics; population data were obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau; and minimum wage data
were obtained from each state’s department of labor.
*Significant at the 90% level.
**Significant at the 95% level.
***Significant at the 99% level.
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Table 2.4
State Labor Market Outcomes by Minimum Wage Status
(Standard Deviation in Parentheses)

Variable
% of Total Employment in
Construction, Dec 2007
% of Total Employment in
Government, Dec 2007

Average Household
Median Income 2007-2008

2007 Annual
Unemployment Rate

Number of states

State
Totals

State Min Wage >
Federal Min Wage
in Dec 2007

State Min Wage =
Federal Min Wage
in Dec 2007

State Min Wage >
Federal Min Wage
in Dec 2009

5.6

5.3

6.1

5.5

(1.5)

(1.5)

(1.4)

(1.7)

17.4

16.8

18.5

17.1

(3.6)

(4.0)

(2.4)

(5.2)

51,557

53,933

47,554

54,434

(7,602)

(7,544)

(5,964)

(5,758)

4.5

4.7

4.1

5.1

(1.0)

(0.9)

(1.1)

(0.9)

51

32

19

15

Source: Employment totals were obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics; state median income was
obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau and corresponds to the two-year average median household income
from 2007 to 2008; and seasonally adjusted unemployment rates were obtained from the Local Area
Unemployment Statistics database of the Bureau of Labor Statistics and correspond to the December 2007
monthly unemployment rate.
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Table 2.5
Effects of Minimum Wages and Relative Construction Industry Employment
on Total Employment
(Standard Error in Parentheses)
Nonfarm Totals

Minimum Wage Dummy 2007
Minimum Wage Dummy 2009
% Change in Relative Minimum Wage Dec
2007 – Dec 2009
% Change in Real Minimum Wage Dec
2007 – Dec 2009
% of Total Employment in Construction
Dec 2007
Ln Population 2007
Hourly Mean Wage 2007
Constant

Adjusted R2
N

1

2

3

4

-1.71**
(0.80)
-

-2.52***
(0.76)

-

-

-

-

0.08
(0.06)

-

-

-

-

0.10*
(0.06)

-0.82***
(0.24)
-1.29***
(0.36)
0.19
(0.18)
15.9***
(5.87)

-0.67***
(0.23)
-1.40***
(0.34)
0.30*
(0.17)
14.4**
(5.51)

-0.79***
(0.25)
-1.30***
(0.37)
0.21
(0.22)
13.9**
(6.43)

-0.86***
(0.26)
-1.31***
(0.37)
0.27
(0.22)
12.8**
(6.31)

0.31

0.40

0.26

0.29

44

44

44

44

Dependent variable is the percentage change in total nonfarm employment from December
2007 to December 2009.
Source: Employment totals and mean hourly wages data were obtained from the Bureau of
Labor Statistics; population data were obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau; and minimum
wage data were obtained from each state’s department of labor.
*Significant at the 90% level.
**Significant at the 95% level.
***Significant at the 99% level.
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Table 2.6
Effects of Minimum Wages and Relative Construction Industry and Government
Employment on Total Employment
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
Nonfarm Totals
1

2

3

4

Minimum Wage Dummy 2007

-0.52
(0.76)

-

-

-

Minimum Wage Dummy 2009

-

-1.80**
(0.67)

-

-

% Change in Relative Minimum
Wage 2007-2009

-

-

0.02
(0.05)

-

% Change in Real Minimum Wage
2007-2009

-

-

-

0.04
(0.05)

-0.88***
(0.21)

-0.79***
(0.20)

-0.87***
(0.21)

-0.91***
(0.22)

0.50***
(0.13)

0.45***
(0.12)

0.52***
(0.12)

0.50***
(0.13)

Ln Population 2007

-0.68*
(0.35)

-0.83**
(0.32)

-0.65*
(0.35)

-0.69*
(0.35)

Hourly Mean Wage 2007

0.16
(0.16)

0.30*
(0.15)

0.17
(0.19)

0.22
(0.18)

Constant

-1.82
(6.90)

-1.56
(6.21)

-3.22
(6.77)

-3.40
(6.70)

0.49

0.56

0.48

0.49

44

44

44

44

% of Total Employment in
Construction Dec 2007
% of Total Employment in
Government Services Dec 2007

Adjusted R2
N

Dependent variable is the percentage change in total nonfarm employment from December
2007 to December 2009.
Source: Employment totals and mean hourly wages data were obtained from the Bureau of
Labor Statistics; population data were obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau; and minimum
wage data were obtained from each state’s department of labor.
*Significant at the 90% level.
**Significant at the 95% level.
***Significant at the 99% level.
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Table 2.7
Effects of Nominal Minimum Wages on Total Employment
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
Nonfarm Totals
1

2

3

4

5

6

-1.24*
(0.64)

-

-1.02
(0.78)

-0.95
(0.63)

-

-0.63
(0.86)

Nominal Minimum Wage Dec
2009

-

-1.75
(1.19)

-0.70
(1.43)

-

-1.40
(0.97)

-0.75
(1.32)

% of Total Employment in
Construction Dec 2007

-

-

-

-0.90***
(0.21)

-0.82***
(0.21)

-0.86***
(0.22)

% of Total Employment in
Government Services Dec 2007

-

-

-

0.49***
(0.12)

0.52***
(0.12)

0.50***
(0.12)

-1.13***
(0.33)

-1.20***
(0.33)

-1.15***
(0.33)

-0.74**
(0.35)

-0.68*
(0.33)

-0.73**
(0.34)

Hourly Mean Wage 2007

0.35**
(0.15)

0.29**
(0.14)

0.37**
(0.15)

0.32
(0.19)

0.23
(0.16)

0.31
(0.19)

Constant

12.8**
(5.58)

20.0**
(9.27)

16.6*
(9.56)

2.47
(7.46)

6.24
(9.16)

5.53
(9.26)

0.23

0.21

0.21

0.51

0.51

0.50

51

51

51

44

44

44

Nominal Minimum Wage Dec
2007

Ln Population 2007

Adjusted R2
N

Dependent variable is the percentage change in total nonfarm employment from December 2007 to
December 2009.
Source: Employment totals and mean hourly wages data were obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics;
population data were obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau; and minimum wage data were obtained from
each state’s department of labor.
*Significant at the 90% level.
**Significant at the 95% level.
***Significant at the 99% level.
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Table 2.8
Effects of Minimum Wages on Employment Levels Controlling for
Differences in Consumer Demand and Unemployment
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
Nonfarm Totals
1

2

3

4

-2.38***
(0.79)

-1.58**
(0.72)

-2.02**
0.84)

-1.05
(0.65)

0.00
(0.00)

0.00
(0.00)

-

-

Unemployment Rate Dec 2007

-

-

-0.40
(0.38)

-0.98***
(0.31)

% of Total Employment in
Construction Dec 2007

-

-0.86***
(0.21)

-

-0.99***
(0.19)

% of Total Employment in
Government Services Dec 2007

-

0.50***
(0.13)

-

0.47***
(0.10)

-1.25***
(0.31)

-0.59
(0.42)

-1.07***
(0.33)

-0.53*
(0.30)

Hourly Mean Wage 2007

0.44**
(0.17)

0.05
(0.31)

0.36***
(0.13)

0.27*
(0.13)

Constant

8.11
(5.30)

-4.86
(7.20)

6.07
(5.01)

-0.49
(5.60)

0.30

0.56

0.30

0.65

51

44

51

44

Minimum Wage Dummy 2009

Median Income 2007

Ln Population 2007

Adjusted R2
N

Dependent variable is the percentage change in total nonfarm employment from December 2007
to December 2009.
Source: Employment totals and mean hourly wages data were obtained from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics; population and median income data were obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau;
minimum wage data were obtained from each state’s department of labor; and seasonally adjusted
unemployment rates were obtained from the Local Area Unemployment Statistics database of the
Bureau of Labor Statistics and correspond to the December 2007 monthly unemployment rate.
*Significant at the 90% level.
**Significant at the 95% level.
***Significant at the 99% level.
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CHAPTER 3
3.1 Estimation of Minimum Wage Effects by Industry
There are several limitations associated with the use of nonfarm employment
totals, many of which can be corrected by using a larger sample of nine 1-digit NAICS
industries. One of the most glaring shortcomings of the nonfarm regressions is the small
sample size. By expanding the selection to include subcategories of nonfarm industries,
we can improve the precision of the estimates. Moreover, if minimum wage effects have
a stronger impact in some industries than in others, nonfarm employment totals, which
average changes across industries, might wash out the industry-level effects. Finally,
industry-level data allow estimation of the effect of a change in minimum wage relative
to the industry mean wage, which should provide a better approximation of the true
impact of minimum wage legislation. With these concerns in mind, I reran the previous
regressions of the change in employment from December 2007 to December 2009 by
state and across 1-digit NAICS industries.9
Table 3.1 presents the results of these industry-level regressions, including a
specification that controls for industry average wages. When comparing Table 3.1 to
Table 2.3, the most notable change is the loss of precision on the minimum wage
indicator variable in column 1. Expanding the sample size appears to have eroded the
disemployment effect seen in Table 2.3 for those states that maintained minimum wages
above the federal level in December 2007. In contrast, those states at the higher wage in

9

Mining and Logging employment data were not reported for AL, CT, DC, DE, FL, GA, HI, LA, MA,
MD, NE, NH, NJ, RI, SC, SD, TN and VT. Construction employment data were not reported for DC, DE,
HI, MD, NE, SD, and TN. Manufacturing employment data were not reported for AL, DC, DE, and HI.
Information services employment data were not reported for HI, ME, MS, NM, NV, OK, OR, RI, VT, and
WV.
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December 2009 appear to have experienced a larger negative effect in the industry-level
specification. As shown in column 2, the disemployment effect seen in this smaller group
of states increased (became more negative) by nearly one percentage point in the later
specifications, from -2.3 percentage points to -3.1 percentage points.
As shown in columns 3 and 4, the impact of the change in real and relative
minimum wages is very similar to the estimates in Table 2.3 (an employment increase of
0.6 percentage points for each one percent increase in relative or real minimum wage
compared to an increase of 0.7 percentage points in the nonfarm model). As in the
nonfarm regression, the change in these minimum wage variables is positive, but has no
significant effect when using the larger sample.
As a final comparison, the control variables of logged population and state mean
wages are similar in sign to the nonfarm regressions, however, the magnitude of the
effect is increased in all instances, and the effect of state mean wages loses some
statistical significance in the industry-level regressions. For example, in Table 2.3, the
coefficients on the logged population variable range from –1.12 to –1.20, while those in
the industry-level regressions measure –1.37 to –1.50. This is approximately a 20-25
percent increase in the effect of population size on employment levels. State mean hourly
wage coefficients increased from a range width of 0.28 to 0.35 in the nonfarm estimates
to 0.23 to 0.39 using industry-level data. The range of the possible effect of average
wages on employment levels has more than doubled in the state-industry specifications.
Since larger samples are often more precise, these differences likely reflect the
more detailed nature of the industry-level data, whereas the loss of variety in the nonfarm
estimates minimizes distinctions. Alternatively, the exaggerated effects of the industry-
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level estimates relative to the nonfarm results suggests that correlation across industries
within the same state in the industry-level regressions has overstated the negative effect
of minimum wage legislation. For example, state tax policy or average levels of state
educational attainment might have similar effects on industries within states, but not
necessarily across states.
As an alternative specification, I estimated the disemployment effects of the
change in minimum wage relative to the industry mean wage.10 As with those studies that
measure the relative impact of minimum wage legislation (Card 1992b, Katz and Krueger
1992, Thompson 2009), we should expect to observe greater disemployment effects in
those state-industries where the industry average wage is relatively close to the real
minimum wage. As the ratio of minimum wage to industry mean wage nears one, a
greater percentage of workers in that industry are likely subject to the minimum wage. In
fact, in those states with minimum wages above the federal level in December 2007,
minimum wages relative to industry mean wages at the beginning of the period were
nearly identical to those states bound by the federal legislation (ratios of 0.35 and 0.34
respectively). By 2009, however, this ratio had grown by only two percentage points in
those states with minimum wages above the federal level, while those at the federal
minimum saw a seven percentage point increase (to 0.37 and 0.41 respectively). These
statistics suggest that a greater proportion of workers were subject to minimum wage

10

Construction wage data were not reported for DC, DE, HI, MD, NE, NH, SD, and TN. Manufacturing
wage data were not reported for DC, MT, NM, NV, and WY. Other Services wage data were not reported
for AK, AR, DE, HI, ID, KY, LA, ME, MO, MS, MT, NE, NH, NM, NV, OK, RI, SD, UT, VT.
There are insufficient data for Mining and Logging and Information Services industry wages, so these
industries were excluded from this specification. Mining and Logging wage data were only reported for
WV and WY during the period of analysis. Information Services wage data were only reported for CA, IL,
MA, MI, NC, NY, PA, TN, UT, and WA.
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legislation at the end of the period of analysis in those states at the federal level, while
those states bound by the higher state minimum wage saw little change.
In column 5 of Table 3.1, I estimate employment change against the change in
minimum wage relative to industry-average wages. As with the real and relative
minimum wage specifications in columns 3 and 4, there appears to be little evidence that
changes in minimum wage relative to industry-average wages impact employment levels.

3.2 Industry-Level Estimates Excluding Construction and Government
Employment
As in the nonfarm employment regressions, I suspected differences in relative
government size and construction industry employment to explain the contradictory
effects observed in these regressions. In fact, as shown in Table 3.2, the estimates from
specifications excluding either construction or government employment are similar in
sign and precision to the results obtained in Tables 2.5 and 2.6. However, the impact of
construction and government employment on the disemployment effects of minimum
wages are reversed in the industry-level specifications. Unlike the nonfarm estimates,
which saw an increase in disemployment in specifications controlling for construction
industry decline, in regressions excluding construction industry employment the effects
of the variables of interest are dampened. For instance, the minimum wage indicator
variables in columns 1 and 2 are both smaller in magnitude than in regressions that
include all industries. The negative effects of relative population size have also
diminished (become less negative) in the regressions excluding construction employment.
The effects of the change in real and relative minimum wages, as shown in columns 3
and 4, have decreased, though they remain positive and statistically insignificant as in the
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earlier regressions. And, once again, those states that maintained minimum wages above
the federal level in December 2009 seem to have experienced the greatest disemployment
effects during this period.
In contrast to those regressions that exclude construction employment, the
estimates omitting employment in government services appear nearly identical to those
seen in Table 2.6, with the not surprising exception of the effect of maintaining a
minimum wage above the federal wage floor in December 2009. Again, in this
specification, as shown in column 6, the effect of supporting a minimum wage above the
federal level in December 2009 is large, negative and statistically significant. Consistent
with the assumption that relatively high levels of government employment protect against
the negative effects of recession, the coefficient on the December 2009 indicator variable
(though not on the December 2007 dummy variable) has shifted upward in magnitude
from –3.13 percentage points to –3.25 percentage points in the estimate that excludes the
impact of government employment.
These conflicting magnitudinal shifts between the nonfarm variables of interest
and those of the industry-level estimates when controlling for construction and
government employment are troubling. We should expect the effect to decrease or
increase in tandem across both specifications. The obvious explanation for this
divergence is that construction and government employment are not measured in the
same manner in each specification. In the nonfarm analysis, construction and government
employment are taken as a percentage of nonfarm employment, while the industry-level
specifications simply omit these industries from the estimation. In industry-level
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estimations that include construction employment as a percentage of total employment,
the coefficients move in the same direction as those of the nonfarm regressions.
In summation, the employment effects of all variables in the industry-level
regressions are slightly exaggerated relative to the estimates of nonfarm employment
totals. In all instances, there are relatively large disemployment effects associated with
those states that possessed a minimum wage above the federal level in either the
beginning or end of the period of analysis, with the worst impact seen in those
specifications excluding government services. The effects of real and relative minimum
wages on employment totals is positive, though small and insignificant in all cases.

3.4 Effects of Nominal Minimum Wages
To discern whether the nominal minimum wage effects seen in Table 2.7 were the
same with the larger sample, I reran the regressions of Table 2.7 using the industry-level
data. I assumed, as in the earlier estimations, that minimum wage effects would be
statistically insignificant from zero when measured as nominal wages. As predicted, (in
results not shown), the nominal minimum wage in either December 2007 or December
2009 had no impact on employment levels when excluding construction employment.
The omission of government employment, on the other hand, only lessened the negative
effect of minimum wage legislation on employment levels. The results of these
regressions point again to an alternative factor that drives both minimum wage legislation
and greater relative disemployment in those states with minimum wages above the
federal minimum.
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3.5 Effects of Minimum Wage on Hours and Earnings
Following the example of Sabia (2009), I used CES data to estimate the change in
average weekly hours against different measures of minimum wage. One extension of
minimum wage legislation suggests that employers adjust total hours worked rather than
workers employed when faced with increases in labor costs. If this is the case, we should
expect to observe a significant decrease in hours in those states that experienced the
largest increase in minimum wage, or those at the federal minimum wage level.
In fact, as shown in Table 3.3, states saw an average decrease in total weekly
hours of 12 percent (standard deviation 9.7) from December 2007 to December 2009. For
those states that are bound by the federal minimum wage, the decrease in hours worked
was roughly 11.1 percent (standard deviation 9.1), while those states that maintained
minimum wages above the federal level lost an average of 13.2 percent (standard
deviation 10.2). These differences, though slight, are reflected in regression estimates of
the effects of minimum wage.
In Table 3.4, I measure the effect of minimum wage legislation on the change in
total weekly hours by state and industry. In these specifications, data for Government
Services were not reported and insufficient data were available for Mining and Logging,
so only seven of the nine 1-digit NAICS industries were included. As is shown in Table
3.2, the exclusion of government employment had little effect on minimum wage
outcomes, so this omission should not constitute a problem. Likewise, mining and
logging industries, which have high average wages, are not likely affected by minimum
wage legislation, so the exclusion of this industry group should have little bearing on the

65

estimation results. Average weekly hours data are not reported for nonfarm totals.11 The
dependent variable was constructed by multiplying average weekly hours by employment
to obtain the total hours worked per week per state-industry. The results of these analyses
mirror those obtained in the employment estimates.
As shown in columns 1 and 2, those states not bound by federal legislation at the
beginning and the end of the period of analysis witnessed an average decline in total
weekly hours relative to those states at the federal level. For those states with minimum
wages above the federal level in December 2007, the decrease in hours worked was
roughly 2.7 percentage points relative to states at the federal level. For the group of states
that maintained minimum wages above the federal wage floor in December 2009, the
decrease in total hours was about 3.1 percentage points more than in states bound by the
federal minimum.
On the contrary, and paralleling the results from the employment regressions, the
effects of changes in real and relative minimum wage during this period were positive,
though again, their influence was small and imprecise. As in the earlier regressions, the
change in minimum wage relative to industry average wage appears to have no effect on
total hours worked. And again, the negative effects of maintaining a minimum wage
above the federal minimum wage disappear when the dummy variables are replaced with

11

Construction hours data were not reported for DC, DE, HI, MD, NE, NH, SD, and TN. Information
services hours data were not reported for AK, AL, AR, AZ, CO, CT, DC, DE, FL, GA, HI, IA, ID, IN, KS,
KY, LA, MD, ME, MN, MO, MS, MT, ND, NE, NH, NJ, NM, NV, OH, OK, OR, RI, SC, SD, TX, VA,
VT, WI, WV, and WY. Manufacturing hours data were not reported for DC, MT, NM, NV, and WY. Other
services hours data were not reported for AK, AR, DE, HI, ID, KY, LA, ME, MO, MS, MT, NE, NH, NM,
NV, OK, RI, SD, UT, and VT.
In regressions excluding information services, dummy variable estimates are slightly greater than those
listed in Table 3.1 (-2.7 percentage points for the December 2007 dummy and –3.4 percentage points for
the December 2009 dummy). The coefficients on both the relative and real minimum wage variables are
small, positive, and not statistically significant from zero.
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nominal wages (results not shown), and when the estimate excludes construction
employment, as shown in Table 3.5.
As an alternative analysis, I estimated the change in average weekly hours against
the minimum wage status of a state at either the beginning or end of the period of
analysis and against the change in real and relative minimum wages. If increases in
minimum wage lead to a decrease in average hours worked, such an impact might appear
in these specifications. In fact, as shown in Table 3.3, average weekly hours fell about 1.8
percent (standard deviation 5.0) during the period of analysis. Like the other labor
statistics, those states with minimum wages above the federal level in December 2007
experienced a larger decrease in average weekly hours than those bound by the federal
legislation (2.1 percent and 1.4 percent respectively).
Consistent with previous estimations, however, the change in average hours
worked is not a direct result of minimum wage legislation. In fact, in estimates measuring
the effect of real and relative minimum wages on average weekly hours (results not
shown), none of the independent variables, including controls for mean wage, population
size, median income and unemployment rate, appear to have any bearing on the negative
outcomes seen in Table 3.3. This suggests that the decline in total hours observed in
Tables 3.4 and 3.5 is a result of decreases in employment, and not a reduction in average
hours.
In a final specification, I estimated the impact of minimum wages on average
weekly earnings. If minimum wages adversely affect high-impact states, we might
observe the outcome as a decrease in earnings, in accordance with a reduction in hours.
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Alternatively, we might measure an increase in earnings as a result of the higher wage if
hours are unaffected by the legislation.
During the period of analysis, average weekly earnings fell 8.4 percent (standard
deviation 12.0) for all states, 9.0 percent (standard deviation 11.9) for those states with
minimum wages above the federal level at the beginning of the recession and only 7.3
percent (standard deviation 12.2) for those states bound by the federal minimum wage –
results suggestive of adverse effects of minimum wage legislation. Again the effect was
the strongest in the smaller group of 15 states that maintained minimum wages above the
federal level in December 2009, (-10.7 percent with a standard deviation 10.8).
In regression analysis, as shown in Table 3.6, the effect of minimum wage
legislation on average weekly earnings is negligible despite an average decrease in hours
of 12 percent. In fact, none of the independent variables appear to have any effect on the
change in earnings, which could indicate model misspecification. An alternative
explanation is that too little variation exists in the state-industry data for accurate
estimation.
In conclusion, I failed to discern any effects of the increase in minimum wage on
employment levels, hours worked, or average weekly earnings. Industry-level estimations
of the effect of minimum wage legislation on employment change are similar in sign and
precision to the results obtained in nonfarm regressions. Again, those states that
maintained minimum wages above the federal minimum in December 2009 appear to
have suffered the greatest degree of disemployment during the period of analysis. This
negative outcome remains in specifications omitting either construction or government
employment, though the disemployment effect is not present in regressions substituting
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nominal minimum wages for the indicator variables. As with the nonfarm regressions, the
change in real and relative minimum wages appear to have no impact on employment
levels, despite the large increase in minimum wage levels during the period of analysis.
Likewise, there were no statistically significant disemployment effects from the change in
minimum wage relative to industry mean wage. Minimum wage legislation cannot
account for the decrease in total weekly hours that occurred during the period of analysis,
and there was no discernable effect on average weekly hours. Finally, average weekly
earnings appear to be unaffected by changes in minimum wage.
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Tables
Table 3.1
Effects of Minimum Wages and Relative Minimum Wage on Employment
by State and Industry
(Standard Error in Parentheses)
Industry Totals
1

2

3

4

5a

-1.59
(0.98)

-

-

-

-

-

-3.13***
(1.02)

-

-

-

-

-

0.06
(0.06)

-

-

-

-

-

0.06
(0.06)

-

-

-

-

-

0.07
(0.05)

-1.42***
(0.41)

-1.50***
(0.41)

-1.43***
(0.42)

-1.41***
(0.42)

-1.37***
(0.50)

0.28
(0.18)

0.38**
(0.18)

0.24
(0.19)

0.23
(0.19)

0.39*
(0.20)

8.95
(6.61)

8.01
(6.50)

8.33
(7.14)

8.00
(7.25)

2.52
(8.18)

Adjusted R2

0.03

0.04

0.02

0.02

0.03

N

418

418

418

418

270

Minimum Wage
Dummy 2007
Minimum Wage
Dummy 2009
% Change in Relative
Min Wage 2007-2009
% Change in Real Min
Wage 2007-2009
% Change in Min Wage
Relative to Industry
Mean Wage 2007-2009

Ln Population 2007
Hourly Mean Wage
2007

Constant

Dependent variable is the percentage change in total industry employment from December
2007 to December 2009.
Source: Employment totals and mean hourly wages data were obtained from the Bureau of
Labor Statistics; population data were obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau; and minimum
wage data were obtained from each state’s department of labor.
a There are insufficient data for Mining and Logging and Information Services industry
wages, so these industries were excluded from this specification. Mining and Logging wage
data were only reported for WV and WY during the period of analysis. Information Services
wage data were only reported for CA, IL, MA, MI, NC, NY, PA, TN, UT, and WA.
*Significant at the 90% level. **Significant at the 95% level. ***Significant at the 99% level.
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Table 3.2
Effects of Minimum Wages on Employment by Industry excluding Construction and Government
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
Industry Totals excluding Construction
1
2
3
4
Minimum Wage Dummy 2007
Minimum Wage Dummy 2009

-0.99
(0.80)
-

-

-

-

-2.13**
(0.84)

-

-

% Change in Relative Minimum Wage
Dec 2007- Dec 2009

-

0.03
(0.05)

% Change in Real Minimum Wage Dec
2007- Dec 2009

-

-

Industry Totals excluding Government
5
6
7
8
-1.53
(1.01)
-

-

-

-

-3.25***
(1.05)

-

-

-

-

0.05
(0.07)

-

71

-1.22***
(0.34)
0.21
(0.14)
8.37
(5.38)

-1.26***
(0.33)
0.29**
(0.14)
7.56
(5.30)

-1.23***
(0.34)
0.17
(0.15)
8.55
(5.80)

0.03
(0.05)
-1.21***
(0.34)
0.18
(0.15)
8.03
(5.88)

Adjusted R2

0.03

0.05

0.03

0.03

0.03

0.05

0.03

0.03

N

374

374

374

374

367

367

367

367

Ln Population 2007
Hourly Mean Wage 2007
Constant

-

-

-

-1.48***
(0.43)
0.29
(0.19)
8.25
(6.81)

-1.55***
(0.42)
0.41**
(0.18)
7.10
(6.69)

-1.49***
(0.43)
0.23
(0.20)
8.04
(7.38)

0.05
(0.06)
-1.47***
(0.43)
0.23
(0.19)
7.81
(7.48)

Dependent variable is the percentage change in total industry employment from December 2007 to December 2009.
Source: Employment totals and mean hourly wages data were obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics; population data were obtained from the U.S.
Census Bureau; and minimum wage data were obtained from each state’s department of labor.
*Significant at the 90% level. **Significant at the 95% level. ***Significant at the 99% level.

Table 3.3
State Labor Market Outcomes by Minimum Wage Status
(Standard Deviation in Parentheses)

Variable
% Change in Total Weekly Hours,
a
Dec 2007-Dec 2009
% Change in Average Weekly Hours,
Dec 2007 – Dec 2009a
% Change in Average Weekly Earnings,
a
Dec 2007 - Dec 2009

Number of states

State Totals

State Min
Wage >
Federal Min
Wage in Dec
2007

State Min
Wage =
Federal Min
Wage in Dec
2007

State Min
Wage >
Federal Min
Wage in Dec
2009

-12.0

-12.6

-11.1

-13.2

(9.65)

(9.96)

(9.05)

(10.2)

-1.82

-2.05

-1.41

-1.74

(5.06)

(4.69)

(5.66)

(4.62)

-8.41

-9.02

-7.32

-10.7

(12.0)

(11.9)

(12.2)

(10.8)

51

32

19

15

Source: Weekly earnings and hours data were obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
a There are insufficient data available for Mining and Logging industry wages, so this industry was
excluded from the mean. Mining and Logging hours and earnings data are only reported for WV and WY
during the period of analysis.
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Table 3.4
Effects of Minimum Wage on Total Weekly Hours Worked
(Standard Error in Parentheses)
Total Weekly Hours
1

2

3

4

5

Minimum Wage Dummy Dec 2007

-2.66**
(1.36)

-

-

-

-

Minimum Wage Dummy Dec 2009

-

-3.12**
(1.40)

-

-

-

% Change in Relative Minimum Wage
Dec 2007-Dec 2009

-

-

0.11
(0.09)

-

-

% Change in Real Minimum Wage
Dec 2007- Dec 2009

-

-

-

0.09
(0.08)

-

% Change in Minimum Wage Relative
to Industry Mean Wage Dec 2007Dec 2009

-

-

-

Ln Population 2007

-1.29**
(0.56)

-1.40**
(0.56)

-1.30**
(0.56)

-1.28**
(0.57)

-1.29**
(0.56)

Hourly Mean Wage 2007

0.58**
(0.25)

0.61**
(0.24)

0.53**
(0.26)

0.49**
(0.25)

0.46**
(0.23)

Constant

-1.72
(8.94)

-1.34
(8.85)

-3.10
(9.68)

-2.90
(9.80)

-2.07
(9.11)

Adjusted R2

0.03

0.03

0.02

0.02

0.02

N

283

283

283

283

283

0.08
0.05

Dependent variable is the percentage change in total weekly hours from December 2007 to
December 2009. There are insufficient data for Mining and Logging hours, so these industries were
excluded from all specifications. Mining and Logging hours data were only reported for WV and
WY during the period of analysis.
Source: Average weekly hours and mean hourly wages data were obtained from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics; population data were obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau; and minimum wage data
were obtained from each state’s department of labor. Total weekly hours variable was calculated by
author.
*Significant at the 90% level.
**Significant at the 95% level.
***Significant at the 99% level
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Table 3.5
Effects of Minimum Wage on Total Weekly Hours excluding Hours
Worked in Construction
(Standard Error in Parentheses)
Total Weekly Hours Excluding
Construction
1

2

3

4

Minimum Wage Dummy Dec 2007

-1.92*
(1.05)

-

-

-

Minimum Wage Dummy Dec 2009

-

-1.70
(1.08)

-

-

% Change in Relative Minimum Wage
Dec 2007- Dec 2009

-

-

0.10
(0.07)

-

% Change in Real Minimum Wage Dec
2007- Dec 2009

-

-

-

0.09
(0.06)

-1.13***
(0.43)

-1.19***
(0.43)

-1.12***
(0.43)

-1.10**
(0.43)

Hourly Mean Wage 2007

0.54**
(0.18)

0.42**
(0.18)

0.43**
(0.19)

0.41**
(0.19)

Constant

0.48
(6.90)

1.24
(6.87)

-1.33
(7.44)

-1.47
(7.52)

Adjusted R2

0.04

0.04

0.03

0.03

N

240

240

240

240

Ln Population 2007

Dependent variable is the percentage change in total weekly hours from December 2007 to
December 2009. There are insufficient data for Mining and Logging hours, so these
industries were excluded from all specifications. Mining and Logging hours data were only
reported for WV and WY during the period of analysis.
Source: Average weekly hours and mean hourly wages data were obtained from the Bureau
of Labor Statistics; population data were obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau; and
minimum wage data were obtained from each state’s department of labor. Total weekly
hours variable was calculated by author.
*Significant at the 90% level.
**Significant at the 95% level.
***Significant at the 99% level

74

Table 3.6
Effects of Minimum Wage on Average Weekly Earnings
(Standard Error in Parentheses)
1

2

3

4

Minimum Wage Dummy Dec 2007

-0.01
(1.27)

-

-

-

Minimum Wage Dummy Dec 2009

-

-0.99
(1.30)

-

-

Average Weekly Earnings

% Change in Relative Minimum Wage
Dec 2007 – Dec 2009

0.01
(0.08)

% Change in Real Minimum Wage Dec
2007-Dec 2009

-

-

-

-0.02
(0.07)

Ln Population 2007

-0.35
(0.52)

-0.37
(0.52)

-0.35
(0.52)

-0.37
(0.53)

Hourly Mean Wage 2007

-0.26
(0.23)

-0.18
(0.23)

-0.25
(0.24)

-0.28
(0.23)

Constant

12.5
(8.36)

11.5
(8.28)

12.3
(9.00)

13.4
(9.11)

Adjusted R2

-0.00

0.00

-0.00

-0.00

283

283

283

283

N

Dependent variable is the percentage change in average weekly earnings from December
2007 to December 2009. There are insufficient data for Mining and Logging earnings, so
these industries were excluded from all specifications. Mining and Logging earnings data
were only reported for WV and WY during the period of analysis.
Source: Average weekly earnings and mean hourly wages data were obtained from the Bureau
of Labor Statistics; population data were obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau; and
minimum wage data were obtained from each state’s department of labor.
*Significant at the 90% level.
**Significant at the 95% level.
***Significant at the 99% level
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CHAPTER 4
Conclusion
Much controversy surrounds minimum wage legislation and its impact on
employment levels. Conventional theories of labor economics suggest that increases in
minimum wage above the market wage will lead to disemployment. Studies estimate
disemployment elasticities of minimum wage legislation in the range of -0.15 to -0.37,
and as high as -1.2 in some instances. There is little convincing evidence of monopsony,
or an increase in employment following implementation of a wage floor, nor is there
indication that a minimum wage increase will provoke higher prices. Despite the growing
popularity of the wage curve, which credits high unemployment for low average wages,
questionable methodology and other discrepancies give doubt to these findings. Finally,
studies suggest that small counties and states with low average wages will experience a
greater adverse impact of minimum wage legislation.
Analyses of minimum wage effects often differ in their choice of dataset and
methodology. Several fundamental components seem to strengthen the findings of some
studies relative to others. These requirements include a national sample, preferably at the
state- or county-level, a long time-frame of analysis or estimation of lagged minimum
wage effects, and the inclusion of state-specific control variables. Firm-level data provide
a clear demand response to minimum wage legislation, while county-level data offer
more variation to the analysis than can be obtained through state averages.
Although most states suffered disemployment during the period of analysis, and
those states with minimum wages above the federal level experienced a larger effect, the
employment decrease cannot be attributed to minimum wage. When controlling for
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differences in relative construction and government employment, and measuring the
effects of nominal minimum wages rather than variables indicating minimum wage
status, the negative impact of minimum wage legislation disappears. Adverse effects
observed in those states that maintained minimum wages above the federal level in
December 2009 are likely the result of other factors, perhaps higher average
unemployment rates. Moreover, in all but one specification, the impact of the changes in
real and relative minimum wage had no statistically significant effect on employment
levels. Differences in employment seem to respond most dramatically to differences in
population and relative construction industry size. These outcomes are consistent across
estimates of nonfarm employment, industry-level employment and total weekly hours.
The effect of minimum wages on average weekly earnings was negligible.
One possible explanation for the seemingly innocuous effect of the real minimum
wage increase for those states at the federal level suggests that the federal minimum wage
was not binding during the period of analysis. Indeed, state mean hourly wages were
nearly three times the federal minimum wage level at the start of the recession, and
remained more than double the federal wage floor when subtracting one standard
deviation. An estimation that uses smaller industry categories to isolate those workers
most likely to be affected by minimum wage legislation might better determine the
likelihood that federal minimum wage was binding during this time period. A possible
extension to my analysis would examine only those lower-tiered NAICS industries that
are most likely subject to minimum wage legislation, the retail industry, for example.
An alternative rationalization suggests that the monopsonistic impact of minimum
wage legislation was overridden by an increased disemployment effect of the recession in
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those states above the federal level. However, when accounting for construction industry
decline, government employment and the unemployment rate, the effect of minimum
wages on employment levels remained statistically insignificant in all regressions. If
there were evidence of monopsony, we should expect to see positive, precise estimates of
minimum wage effects when controlling for other economic conditions.
Alternatively, the absence of minimum wage effects could be attributed to
homogeneity in the data. For example, insufficient variation in relative minimum wages
might prevent comparison across states. Indeed, during the period of analysis, average
relative minimum wages were very similar in states with minimum wages above the
federal level as compared to those bound by the federal legislation. On the other hand,
real minimum wages exhibited relatively greater variation during this time-frame, but the
effect of the change in real minimum wages was virtually identical to that of relative
minimum wages.
As mentioned previously, the true impact of minimum wage legislation might be
obscured by positive correlation of observations across industries within a state. Such an
effect would cause downward bias of regression estimates. However, correcting for this
possibility would lessen the incidence of disemployment as a result of minimum wage
legislation, rather than strengthen negative effects.
Finally, there is some concern that the control variables used in my estimates do
not adequately reflect state economic conditions at the end of the period of analysis. The
controls chosen describe economies as they were at the beginning of the recession, but
they do not account for subsequent changes. For example, population shifts in response to
high unemployment rates could obscure minimum wage effects. That being said,
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statistics show little evidence of huge population shifts during the period of analysis.
Moreover, as was shown in the data, the state mean wage experienced only a slight
increase during this time period, with similar growth rates across states.
Teasing out the broader effects of minimum wage legislation has its challenges.
Unfortunately, we cannot place the economy under a microscope or administer controlled
experiments to determine the true effect of legislated wage floors. Negative effects of
minimum wage legislation could have real consequences for the most vulnerable
members of our labor force, or those whom the legislation aims to protect. As
economists, we strive to uncover these negative outcomes, so governments can correct
the resulting inequalities and inefficiencies of policy. A well-formulated, comprehensive
analysis should provide the best assessment of minimum wage legislation.
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APPENDIX
Tables
Table A.1
States with Minimum Wages above the
Federal Minimum Wage
December 2007

State

Minimum
Wage

December 2009

State

Minimum
Wage

MD
$ 6.15
CO
$ 7.28
MN
$ 6.15
OH
$ 7.30
MT
$ 6.15
MI
$ 7.40
NC
$ 6.15
RI
$ 7.40
IA
$ 6.20
NM
$ 7.50
AR
$ 6.25
ME
$ 7.50
NV
$ 6.33
NV
$ 7.55
MO
$ 6.50
CA
$ 8.00
NH
$ 6.50
CT
$ 8.00
WI
$ 6.50
IL
$ 8.00
WV
$ 6.55
MA
$ 8.00
DE
$ 6.65
VT
$ 8.06
FL
$ 6.67
DC
$ 8.25
AZ
$ 6.75
OR
$ 8.40
CO
$ 6.85
WA
$ 8.55
OH
$ 6.85
DC
$ 7.00
ME
$ 7.00
AK
$ 7.15
MI
$ 7.15
NJ
$ 7.15
NY
$ 7.15
PA
$ 7.15
HI
$ 7.25
RI
$ 7.40
CA
$ 7.50
IL
$ 7.50
MA
$ 7.50
VT
$ 7.53
CT
$ 7.65
OR
$ 7.80
WA
$ 7.93
Source: Minimum wage data were obtained from each
state’s Department of Labor.
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Table A.2
Employment Change by State from December 2007
to December 2009
% Employment
State
Change State
NV
-13.1 MT
AZ
-10.8 MN
FL
-10.1 ME
MI
-9.5 NM
CA
-9.0 MO
OR
-8.5 MA
ID
-8.2 MD
GA
-8.1 WY
OH
-7.8 AR
AL
-7.8 PA
TN
-7.8 VA
IN
-7.6 IA
RI
-7.5 KS
IL
-7.1 VT
SC
-6.9 WV
NC
-6.8 NY
UT
-6.8 OK
HI
-6.6 NH
DE
-6.5 TX
WI
-6.5 NE
WA
-6.3 LA
CO
-6.2 SD
MS
-6.1 DC
CT
-5.6 AK
NJ
-5.6 ND
KY
-5.6
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics

% Employment
Change
-5.6
-5.4
-5.3
-5.2
-4.9
-4.6
-4.5
-4.3
-4.4
-4.4
-4.4
-4.3
-4.3
-4.2
-3.7
-3.6
-3.6
-3.5
-2.9
-2.9
-2.8
-2.0
0.3
0.7
1.2
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Bureau of Labor Statistics Data
The Bureau of Labor Statistics reconfigured their website several times in the six months since beginning
my analysis, causing me many headaches and much confusion. Entire webpages were removed, and
seasonally adjusted 5-year benchmarks were revised with significant impact on my estimations. Despite
these implementation hiccups, the BLS website is vastly improved. Most statistics are easily accessible
through the interactive search feature under the Databases and Tables tab, and data are now downloadable
in Microsoft Excel. However, limitations in reporting still prevail. Below is a table listing the data
availability of each of the dependent variables in my analysis.
Data are available for all 50 states plus Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, in some cases, and statewide or
by metropolitan region. The nine 1-digit NAICS categories are Mining and Logging; Construction;
Manufacturing; Trade, Transportation and Utilities; Information Services; Professional and Business
Services; Leisure and Hospitality; Other Services, and Government. Data are also available for Nonfarm
Totals and many of the NAICS subcategories. Data are reported monthly from January 2000.

Variable
Seasonally Adjusted
All Employees, in Thousands
Not Seasonally Adjusted
All Employees, in Thousands
Average Weekly Hours of All
Employees
Average Weekly Earnings of All
Employees, in Dollars
Average Hourly Earnings of All
Employees, in Dollars

Number of 1-digit state-level NAICS observations for
December 2009

469 Puerto Rico and Virgin Islands data are not reported

468
Puerto Rico and Virgin Islands data are not reported; Nonfarm

285 Totals and Government Services are not reported
Puerto Rico and Virgin Islands data are not reported; Nonfarm

285 Totals and Government Services are not reported
Puerto Rico and Virgin Islands data are not reported; Nonfarm

285 Totals and Government Services are not reported

Production or
Nonsupervisory Workers
Employees, in Thousands
Average Weekly Hours
Average Weekly Earnings, in
Dollars
Average Hourly Earnings, in
Dollars

39
89

Virgin Islands data are not reported; Nonfarm Totals, Other
Services and Government Services are not reported
Nonfarm Totals and Government Services are not reported

89

Nonfarm Totals and Government Services are not reported

89

Nonfarm Totals and Government Services are not reported
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